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Abstract 
This paper explores the economic consequences of proposed EU reforms for a common consolidated 
corporate tax base. The reforms replace separate accounting with formula apportionment as a way to 
allocate corporate tax bases across countries. To assess the economic implications, we use a numerical 
CGE model for Europe. It encompasses several decision margins of firms such as marginal investment, 
FDI decisions, and multinational profit shifting. The simulations suggest that consolidation does not 
yield substantial welfare gains for Europe. The variation of effects across countries is large and 
depends on the choice of the apportionment formula. Consolidation with formula apportionment does 
not weaken incentives for tax competition. Tax competition instead offers a rationale for rate 
harmonisation, in addition to base harmonisation. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Dit artikel onderzoekt de economische gevolgen van EU-voorstellen voor een hervorming van 
de vennootschapsbelasting met een gemeenschappelijke geconsolideerde grondslag. In het 
huidige Vpb-systeem hanteert elke lidstaat een eigen grondslag en een eigen tarief. In het 
nieuwe systeem komt er een Europese grondslag, dat met een verdeelsleutel wordt toegerekend 
naar de lidstaten, waarop zij elk hun eigen tarief mogen hanteren. We gebruiken een toegepast 
algemeen evenwichtsmodel om de economische gevolgen van deze hervorming te analyseren. 
Het model bevat een aantal beslispunten van bedrijven, over hun uitbreidingsinvesteringen, 
directe buitenlandse investeringen en internationale winstverschuiving. De simulaties laten zien 
dat voor de EU geen grote welvaartswinsten verwacht mogen worden van deze hervorming. De 
variatie van deze effecten tussen landen is groot en bovendien sterk afhankelijk van de 
gehanteerde verdeelsleutel. Bovendien leidt deze Vpb-hervorming niet tot een vermindering 
van belastingconcurrentie. De enige oplossing hiervoor is een uniform tarief, in aanvulling op 
de grondslagharmonisatie. 
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This  paper  explores  the  economic  consequences  of  proposed  EU  reforms  for  a  common  consolidated 
corporate  tax  base.  The  reforms  replace  separate  accounting  with  formula  apportionment  as  a  way  to 
allocate corporate tax bases across countries. To assess the economic implications, we use a numerical CGE 
model for Europe. It encompasses several decision margins of firms such as marginal investment, FDI 
decisions,  and  multinational  profit  shifting.  The  simulations  suggest  that  consolidation  does  not  yield 
substantial welfare gains for Europe. The variation of effects across countries is large and depends on the 
choice  of  the  apportionment  formula.  Consolidation  with  formula  apportionment  does  not  weaken 
incentives for tax competition. Tax competition instead offers a rationale for rate harmonisation, in addition 
to base harmonisation. 
                                                            
1 Paper presented at the 50th Economic Policy panel meeting in Tilburg.   2 
1. Introduction 
The European Commission claims that existing corporate tax systems in Europe are highly inefficient 
(European Commission, 2001). This is partly due to the principle of separate accounting under which 
multinational firms file separate accounts in each country where they operate. Indeed, determining the 
exact source of profits is often difficult and arbitrary. It leaves opportunities for multinationals to engage 
in profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions and causes disputes among governments and firms on the 
appropriate transfer prices for intra-company transactions. To reduce these inefficiencies, the European 
Commission (2004) proposes an alternative system based on consolidation with formula apportionment. 
Under that regime, also used in the United States and Canada, each multinational computes its EU-wide 
consolidated profits. These are allocated to Member States on the basis of an apportionment formula 
containing e.g. employment, payroll, assets, and/or sales. Each member state can then tax the allocated 
profits at its own tax rate. In determining the consolidated tax base, the European Commission aims at a 
common definition of the tax base and one single formula. The proposal is labelled CCCTB: common 
consolidated corporate tax base. 
 
This paper explores various margins which might be considered inefficient under the existing system, 
and which might be affected by such a reform, including profit shifting, factor reallocations and loss 
consolidation. We do this by using a computable general equilibrium model for the EU-27. The model 
has  been  designed  to  analyse  corporate  tax  policy  in  the  EU.  It  encompasses  several  behavioural 
distortions  associated  with  corporation  taxes,  such  as  the  debt/equity  choice,  marginal  investment 
decisions, discrete location choices and profit shifting. The last two of these incorporate international 
spillovers. The model captures detailed aspects of the corporate tax systems of all member states like 
statutory  rates,  fiscal  depreciation  schemes  and  nominal  interest  deductibility.  Data  from  company 
financial  reports  are  used  to  calibrate  country-specific  parameters  such  as  debt-equity  ratios  and 
economic depreciation rates. The model allows for company losses in order to explore the impact of loss 
consolidation. 
 
Only  a  few  examples  of  relevant  general  equilibrium  simulations  are  available  in  the  literature. 
Edmiston (2002) applies a CGE model to strategic formula apportionment policies in the US. Sørensen 
(2004b) simulates with a CGE model for the OECD the welfare gains from a complete CIT rate and 
base harmonization in the EU. He does not consider the consolidation of the tax base with formula 
apportionment. 
 
In principle, the CCCTB could reduce compliance costs as multinationals can reap economies of scale 
and scope in accounting practices. Moreover, multinationals no longer have to determine transfer prices 
for  complicated  intra-company  transactions.  The  European  Commission  (2001)  estimates  the  costs 
related to transfer pricing in multinational companies at 3% of the revenues they generate. However, it is 
difficult to determine the proportion of these costs that can be actually reduced via the CCCTB. For 
instance, transfer pricing vis à vis third countries will remain when consolidation is limited to the EU. 
Given this uncertainty we abstract from a change in compliance costs in the simulations of the CCCTB. 
   3 
In simulating the CCCTB reform, we assume revenue neutrality in each country by an adjustment of 
other taxes, such as labour taxes, corporate tax rates or lump-sum taxes. The simulations suggest that the 
CCCTB does not  yield  substantial  welfare gains, especially if other distortionary taxes are used to 
balance the government budget. This is because distortions in the current system are replaced by equally 
large new distortions induced by the formula. The introduction of loss consolidation can be welfare 
improving (Weiner, 2002; Devereux, 2004; Nicodème, 2007). However, this welfare gain disappears if 
the decline in tax revenue is compensated by higher labour or corporate tax rates. More substantial than 
the aggregate EU-wide economic effects are the economic consequences for individual countries. Indeed 
we find that the distribution of corporate tax revenue, as well as country-specific welfare effects, is 
diverse. Moreover, they depend strongly on the choice of the apportionment formula. By considering 
alternative  formulas,  we  assess  which  countries  gain  or  lose  from  consolidation  under  alternative 
designs of the CCCTB. The openness of an economy, the statutory tax rate and in particular the capital 
intensity are shown to determine the distribution of gains and losses under alternative formulas. 
 
The  paper  explores  how  the  introduction  of  the  CCCTB  would  affect  behaviour  by  firms  and 
governments. Under the current system of separate accounting, multinational assets and profits respond 
to differences in (effective) tax rates across countries. These effects tend to induce governments to 
compete for tax bases by lowering their tax rates. Under full consolidation of the tax base, profit shifting 
within the EU is no longer feasible. However, multinationals can still respond to tax rate differentials: 
by relocating factors to low-tax countries, they change the weights in the apportionment formula and 
thus reduce their overall tax liability (Hellerstein and McLure, 2004; Martens-Weiner, 2006). Hence, tax 
competition does not disappear under consolidation but will take a different form. In this paper we 
explore whether tax competition between governments would be likely to be more or less intense with 
consolidation with formula apportionment, and which countries would gain and lose. By simulating 
unilateral  corporate  tax  cuts  under  both  separate  accounting  and  consolidation,  we  show  that 
consolidation does not make tax cuts less beneficial for governments. Rather, low-tax countries benefit 
more from a unilateral tax cut than under separate accounting. This implies that consolidation with 
formula  apportionment  may  cause  further  competition  in  tax  rates  in  the  EU,  thereby  exacerbating 
distortions  in  the  allocation  of  capital.  It  offers  an  argument  that  tax  base  consolidation  should  be 
accompanied with rate harmonisation. Indeed, our simulations suggest that rate harmonisation produces 
modest welfare gains for the EU. 
 
The  debate  on  the  CCCTB  raises  several  fundamental  questions  that  require  consideration  when 
assessing  its  attractiveness  for  the  EU.  One  relevant  question  is  the  role  of  corporate  taxation  in 
European systems under a CCCTB. For instance, how should the CCCTB affect the integration of the 
corporate  tax  with  personal  taxes  on  capital  income  in  Europe?  Moreover,  what  principle  should 
underlie corporate tax systems under a CCCTB, i.e. source, residence or destination. This paper does not 
discuss these issues in detail; see e.g. Fuest (2008) for a discussion.  
 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  elaborates  on  the  EU  debate  on  tax 
consolidation and the experiences in the US and Canada. Section 3 describes our CGE model. Section 4 
demonstrates  the  outcomes  for  the  CCCTB  reform.  Section  5  considers  a  range  of  alternative 
apportionment formulas. Section 6 looks at incentives for tax competition by comparing unilateral rate   4 
changes under separate accounting and consolidation. It also explores the impact of rate harmonisation. 
Section 7 contains a sensitivity analysis of a number of  simulations to show the robustness of our 
findings. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The EU debate, and lessons from elsewhere 
2.1. EU debate on corporate tax consolidation 
 
Proposals to harmonize taxes in the European Union are not a  new phenomenon. While the  treaty 
articles have generated progress in the case of indirect taxation, the harmonization of corporate taxation 
is driven by the commitment to create a single market. This implies that the unanimity principle applies 
which, in combination with widely diverging interests of the individual member states, complicates the 
harmonization process. As a result, corporate tax harmonization efforts have not been very successful, 
despite many proposals having been made. The ongoing debate has had the important side effect of 




Partly  influenced  by  the  business  community,  the  focus  of  the  current  corporate  tax harmonization 
debate has shifted to the removal of obstacles for cross-border investment and the difficulty of dealing 
with  numerous  different  tax  laws.  While  there  has  been  progress  in  the  removal  of  cross  border 
investment, e.g. the parent-subsidiary directive abolished withholding taxes on dividend flow between 
associated companies, the harmonization process has been sluggish. In 2004, member states considered 
four methods of harmonizing corporate tax: 
i.)  a EU corporate tax rate (with full harmonization of rates and bases), 
ii.)  a compulsory harmonized method to compute the tax base, 
iii.)  the same harmonized method to compute tax bases but made optional, and 
iv.)  a system of Home State Taxation (subsidiaries are taxed according to the headquarter country’s  
tax law).  




Consequently a working group chaired by the European Commission was established to work out the 
exact  details  of  a  proposal  of  a  common  consolidated  corporate  tax  base  (CCCTB).  Currently  the 
European Commission appears to be in favour of an optional CCCTB with a weighted formula (sales by 
destination, assets and employment) used for apportionment. There are no plans for harmonization of 
rates at the moment, as the Commission has repeatedly stressed.
4 The initial plan was to produce a 
legislative proposal by the end of 2008, but this has been delayed. 
                                                            
2 See Radaelli and Kraemer (2008) for a detailed discussion of the actors in the EU tax policy.  
3 Nicodème (2007) provides a useful summary of the corporate tax harmonization debate in the European Union.  
4 See European Commission (2006).    5 
 
The current system of corporate income taxation in the European Union (EU) is based on separate 
accounting. It means that the taxable income of a multinational enterprise is determined as the income 
generated in each jurisdiction, in principle with arms length prices used for intra-company transactions. 
Under the alternative system of consolidation, taxable income is aggregated over all member states to 
yield a single aggregate tax base for each company in the EU. In the United States, Canada and the 
proposed CCCTB system in the EU, the consolidated tax base is apportioned to individual states or 
countries via a formula. In the US, states may use their own formula. Factors used include sales, payroll 
and assets. States can apply their own rate to the apportioned part of the corporate tax base. In the EU 
discussion on the CCCTB, the intention is to use a single and common formula to allocate profits across 
the EU Member States. Countries could then apply their own rate to the apportioned share of the tax 
base.  
2.2. Lessons from the US and Canada 
The literature on formula apportionment concentrates on the distortions induced by the formula. The 
choice of the apportionment formula is important for two reasons. First, it determines the distribution of 
the tax base across jurisdictions. A state that is abundant in capital-intensive production will receive a 
relatively large share of profits if capital is used in the formula. A state with many consumers but no 
production facilities will gain more if sales are used to apportion the tax base. Hence, each country will 
have a different interest as to what apportionment factors are used. Second, formula apportionment 
imposes an implicit excise tax on the apportionment factor. Indeed, firms can influence their corporate 
tax liability by locating the factors that enter the formula in low-tax jurisdictions. As long as tax rates 
differ across states, the allocation of investment and employment will thus be influenced under formula 
apportionment. A well-developed empirical literature explores how the variation in the apportionment 
formulas and tax rates affects investment and employment by multinationals. The majority of these 
studies are for the US. They confirm the impact of the formula on factor allocation, see e.g. Weiner 
(1994), Klassen and Shackelford (1998), Gupta and Hofmann (2003) and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000). 
Canadian provinces use the same formula but differ in their tax rates. Multinationals can exploit these 
differences  by  reallocating  factors  to  low-tax  provinces.  Mintz  and  Smart  (2004)  use  Canadian 
administrative tax data and find that the elasticity of taxable income to tax rates is significantly higher 
for firms that engage in factor shifting. Also Weiner (1994) and Klassen and Shackelford (1998) find 
evidence for factor shifting to low-tax provinces. 
 
3. The CORTAX model 
This paper uses the CORTAX model to assess the economic impact of the CCCTB. CORTAX is an 
applied general equilibrium  model describing the 27 countries of the European Union, the US and 
Japan.  The  model  is  designed  to  simulate  the  economic  implications  of  unilateral  and  multilateral 
corporate tax policies. It concentrates on the long-run effects in the steady state. The structure of each 
country is the same and countries are linked via trade in goods and capital and via multinational firms. 
We set shares to replicate aggregates from national accounts data in 2005 and country averages from   6 
data on firm accounts in the ORBIS database, a comprehensive set of over 9 million companies based on 
standardized balance sheet information. Parameters in CORTAX also replicate empirical elasticities 
found in the economic literature. CORTAX is heavily inspired by the OECDTAX-model of Sørensen 
(2001, 2004a). An earlier version was used for European tax policy analysis in Bettendorf et al. (2006, 
2007), Van der Horst et al. (2007) and De Mooij and Devereux (2009). A detailed description of the 
structure and parameterisation of the model can be found in Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2008). 




The  government  does  not  optimize  its  policies.  We  simply  modify  tax  and  expenditure  parameters 
exogenously. On the revenue-side of the government budget, we have indirect taxes on consumption and 
direct  taxes  on  corporate  income  and  labour  income.  The  expenditure  side  features  government 
consumption, interest payments on public debt and lump-sum transfers. In performing simulations, we 
keep the government budget balanced by adjusting one of the tax parameters endogenously. We always 
keep government consumption and public debt constant as a fraction of GDP. The initial labour and 
consumption  tax  rates  are  calibrated  by  using  effective  taxes  from  Eurostat  (2007).  Corporate  tax 
systems are calibrated using legal data on taxes and depreciation allowances for 2005.
5 In the baseline, 
corporate tax changes in 2006 and 2007 are simulated so that reforms are considered relative to the 
systems in 2007. Hence, we include the Allowance for Corporate Equity that Belgium introduced in 
2006. The values of statutory corporate tax rates, the net present value of depreciation allowances and 
the EMTR (average of debt and equity financed investment) are reported in Table 1. In computing the 
EMTR, we include personal income taxes applying to dividends and capital gains.  
                                                            
5 In the calibration, we modify the tax base indicator for Estonia. In principle, the value of fiscal depreciation is zero in Estonia as no depreciation 
allowances are available. However, Estonia does not tax retained profits but only levies a 22% tax rate on profit distributions. Hence, corporate 
profits in Estonia go untaxed as long as they are not repatriated to the parent or distributed to shareholders. To bring the system more in line with 
other countries in the model, we modify the corporate tax base by assuming a positive allowance in Estonia so as to replicate its observed corporate-
tax-to-gdp ratio. We maintain the Estonian corporate tax rate at 22%. 
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Table 1: Calibration of corporate taxation in CORTAX, data 2007 
Country  CIT rate  NPV allowances  EMTR 
  %  %  % 
Austria  25  42  6 
Belgium  34  58  -1 
Bulgaria  10  46  3 
Cyprus  10  46  3 
Czech Republic  24  44  9 
Denmark  25  59  5 
Estonia  22  70  0 
Germany  36  44  8 
Finland  26  49  7 
France  33  50  8 
Greece  25  47  6 
Hungary  16  41  5 
Ireland  13  40  3 
Italy  37  44  7 
Latvia  15  62  3 
Lithuania  18  69  3 
Luxembourg  30  49  14 
Malta  35  36  14 
Netherlands  26  44  7 
Poland  19  42  7 
Portugal  27  50  5 
Romania  16  64  3 
Slovak Republic  19  51  5 
Slovenia  23  55  6 
Spain  33  39  11 
Sweden  28  49  6 
United Kingdom  30  48  4 
Japan  41  42  15 
United States  39  42  14 
Source: European Commission and ORBIS database 
 
Households 
Following the overlapping generations model of Diamond, households live for two periods. One may 
interpret  one  period  to  cover  40  years.  We  express  all  variables  in  annual  terms  to  facilitate  the 
interpretation in terms of national accounts data. Behaviour within each 40-year period is assumed to be 
constant. Households make their decisions regarding work, consumption and saving by maximizing a 
life-time utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. When young (i.e. the first period), 
households choose to allocate their time between leisure and work. When old (i.e. the second period) 
households do not work but only consume. Young households receive after-tax wage income and lump-
sum transfers. This income at a young age is allocated over consumption and savings. Savings are   8 
invested in a mix of bonds and stocks, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes and which yield 
different rates of return. In the second period, households are retired. Consumption at old age is financed 
by the assets saved from the first period plus an after-tax rate of return and by lump-sum transfers. 
Moreover, the older generation is assumed to own the fixed factor used by firms.  
 
Household optimization yields expressions for labour supply, consumption, savings and the optimal 
asset portfolio. Asset returns are determined on world markets. The most important distortion is related 
to the consumption/leisure choice.  Labour supply behaviour in CORTAX is  governed by the usual 
income  and  substitution  effects.  Most  empirical  studies  suggest  that  substitution  effects  dominate 
income effects so that the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply is positive (see Evers et al., 2008). 
In CORTAX, we set for all countries the utility parameters so that we obtain a positive uncompensated 
elasticity of labour supply. Values differ due to country variation in hours worked, but on average the 
labour supply elasticity is 0.19. 
 
Firms 
In  CORTAX,  one  representative  domestic  firm  and  one  representative  multinational  headquarter  is 
located in each country. The multinational owns a subsidiary in each foreign country. With 29 countries 
in CORTAX, we thus have 30 different firms operating in each country, namely the representative 
domestic firm, the representative headquarter and 28 subsidiaries that are owned by the headquarters in 
the other countries.  
 
Each firm maximises its value – equal to the net present value of all future cash flows – subject to the 
accumulation constraints and a production function. The production function  features  three primary 
factors: labour, capital and a fixed factor. Labour is immobile across borders and wages are determined 
on national labour markets. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile internationally so that the return to 
capital (after corporate taxes) is given for each country on the world capital market. The fixed factor is 
location-specific (e.g. land) and supplied inelastically. The income from the fixed factor reflects an 
economic rent. The fixed factor may have a variety of interpretations. For instance, it may represent 
location-specific agglomeration caused by increasing returns to scale in production, as emphasised in the 
new economic geography literature (see e.g. Brakman et al., 2001). Alternatively, it may reflect land as 
a  location-specific  fixed  factor  of  production.  Another  interpretation  is  that  the  fixed  factor  is  not 
location specific but firm specific, e.g. due to managerial skills, a brand name or patents. In that case, 
the factor may become responsive to tax, a case that we discuss in more detail below. 
 
In calibrating the model of the firm, capital and labour parameters are determined by national accounts 
data on labour- and capital income shares. The labour income share is approximately 0.7 on average in 
the EU and lies between 0.6 and 0.8 for different countries. Investment is determined by the cost of 
capital. The responsiveness of investment to the cost of capital depends on the substitution elasticity 
between labour and capital. Most general equilibrium models adopt values between 0.5 and 1.0. We use 
a value of 0.7 in the basic calibration. We have no direct information that we can use to calibrate the 
income share of the fixed factor in the model. We set it at 2.5% of value-added in each country. It is 
chosen such that CORTAX yields corporate tax-to-GDP ratios that fit observed values on average.  A 
sensitivity analysis will shed light on the implications of this assumption.   9 
 
Table 2: Key elasticities in CORTAX 
Elasticities of substitution     
   Intertemporal    0.5 
   Intratemporal (consumption - leisure)    1.0 
   Capital - labour    0.7 
     
Income share of location specific capital    2.5% 
Income share intermediate inputs (of subsidiaries)    10.0% 
     
Implied semi-elasticities  Min  Max 
Labour supply to wage  0.08  0.31 
Savings to interest rate  0.41  0.81 
Capital stock to statutory CIT  -0.09  -0.64 
Incoming FDI to statutory CIT  -0.10  -2.71 
Debt share to statutory CIT  0.17  0.35 
Incoming transfer price to statutory CIT  -0.69  -1.88 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The impact of the corporate tax on the cost of capital depends on the initial corporate tax system and is 
measured by the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). Table 1 offers insight in corporate tax systems by 
showing rates and the net present value of depreciation allowances in percentage of the purchase price. 
It also shows the EMTR which is computed as a weighted average of an investment financed by debt 
and equity. The EMTR ranges from – 1% in Belgium (which has an allowance for corporate equity in 
place) to 14% in Malta. The higher is the initial EMTR, the more responsive is investment to changes in 
the corporate tax rate. Table 2 shows that the tax-rate elasticity of investment to the corporate tax rate 
ranges between – 0.1 and – 0.6. 
 
Firms  finance  their  investment  by  issuing  bonds  and  by  retaining  earnings  (issuing  new  shares  is 
excluded). The optimal financial structure depends on the difference between the after-tax cost of debt 
and equity. Along the lines of the trade-off theory, we include a financial distress cost associated with 
high debt positions. The marginal cost of debt finance increases in the debt share. In CORTAX, the 
convexity of the financial distress cost determines the impact of corporate taxation on a firms’ financial 
policy. We set the parameters in this function so as to obtain a semi-elasticity of the debt share with 
respect to the corporate tax rate between 0.2 and 0.4, which is consistent with recent empirical studies 
(see Weichenrieder and Klautke, 2008).  
 
The size of corporate tax distortions in CORTAX can be assessed by simulating a system that is neutral 
with  respect  to  investment  and  financing  decisions.  De  Mooij  and  Devereux  (2009)  explore  an 
allowance for corporate equity (ACE)  with CORTAX, which is known to be neutral with respect to 
financing and investment decisions. They report that an ACE financed by a lump-sum tax yields a 
welfare gain of 0.6% of GDP, on average in the EU. This welfare gain ranges from 0.3% of GDP in 
countries with small corporate tax distortions to more than 1% of GDP for countries with high effective 
marginal tax rates. This welfare gain is approximately one third of the revenues raised by corporate 
taxes.  Hence,  corporate  tax  systems  impose  a  sizeable  excess  burden  via  investment  and  financial 
distortions. 
   10 
Multinationals 
In maximising the value of the firm, multinationals take the sum of the values in the headquarter and the 
subsidiaries. In addition to choices on investment and financial structure, multinationals decide about 
the  location  of  investment  across  subsidiaries  (denoted  as  foreign  direct  investment,  FDI)  and  the 
allocation of profits. CORTAX assumes that the multinational owns a given fixed factor in each country 
which it can only use to produce via the subsidiary. The size of the fixed factor in each country is 
determined by data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks. These stocks differ considerably 
between countries in the EU. Stocks are generally small in Central and Eastern Europe, especially the 
outward stocks. They are large in some small Western EU countries, like the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Ireland. Luxembourg stands out with a sum of the inward and outward FDI stock of more than 10 times 
its GDP.
6 Given the fixed factor in each location, the multinational decides how much capital and labour 
to  employ  in  each  foreign  subsidiary.  The  cost  of  capital  determines  the  amount  of  capital  the 
multinational is  willing to invest. Thus, changes in inward FDI is governed by the EMTR in each 
location. The implied elasticity of FDI to the statutory rate ranges between − 0.1 and − 2.7, depending 
on the initial distortion of the corporate tax system.  
 
Recent  empirical  studies  emphasise  that  multinationals  not  only  respond  to  changes  in  the  cost  of 
capital, but also to effective average tax rates (see e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux and 
Lockwood,  2006).  Hence,  inframarginal  choices  regarding  profitable  discrete  investment  locations 
depend on corporate taxes. In terms of our model, we may interpret this as if rents from the fixed factor 
are firm-specific, implying that the location of these rents can move across borders. Modelling this 
location  choice  from  microeconomic  principles  within  the  context  of  CORTAX  is  difficult.  Yet,  a 
simple ad-hoc extension of CORTAX is to make the size of the fixed factor dependent of the corporate 
tax rate. In a sensitivity analysis, we consider how this extension affects our results. Thereby, we set the 
response of the fixed factor in subsidiaries such that CORTAX replicates an aggregate semi-elasticity of 
FDI to the effective average tax rate of – 6.0. This equals the consensus estimate obtained in a recently 
updated  meta  analysis  by  De  Mooij  and  Ederveen  (2008).  In  the  extended  model,  we  assume  that 
location choices are responsive only to tax differences within the EU, not between the EU and other 
world regions.  
 
In CORTAX, foreign subsidiaries need intermediate inputs to produce output. These are supplied by the 
parent company. As there is only one homogeneous good in the model, the arms-length price for this 
intermediate  input  is  equal  to  the  market  price  determined  on  world  markets.  However,  the  parent 
company can charge a transfer price for intra-company deliveries that deviates from this arms-length 
price. In particular, a headquarter company has an incentive to set an artificially low (high) transfer price 
for supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) statutory corporate tax rate. In this 
way, the multinational shifts profits from high to low-tax countries, thereby reducing its overall tax 
liability. The benefits from profit shifting thus rise linearly in the tax difference between countries. We 
specify a convex cost function to capture the costs associated with manipulated transfer pricing, e.g. due 
to fines imposed by governments. Hence, profit shifting to countries with very low corporate tax rates 
becomes increasingly costly at the margin. The elasticity of transfer pricing with respect to the corporate 
                                                            
6 Throughout the article, we do not present outcomes for Luxembourg which is a severe outlier due to its exceptional position in terms of foreign 
direct investment. Hence, we report effects for only 26 European countries.   11 
tax rate is determined by the parameters in the cost function and is set to obtain a tax elasticity of 
transfer pricing of around − 1.4 on average over all countries. The tax elasticity ranges between − 0.8 in 
low-tax countries and − 2 in high-tax countries. To compare this to the empirical evidence on profit 
shifting, we translate it into a semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base. This depends on the share of 
intrafirm trade which, in CORTAX, is proportional to bilateral FDI stocks. The tax-rate elasticity of the 
corporate tax base has an average value of − 0.23, implying that the corporate tax base shrinks by 0.23% 
due to profit shifting if the corporate tax rate is increased by 1%-point. The majority of countries feature 
a  smaller  elasticity  as  their  multinational  sector  is  small.  This  holds  for  most  Central  and  Eastern 
European  countries.  For  countries  with  a  large  multinational  sector,  elasticities  are  larger.  In  the 
Netherlands, a 1%-point higher corporate tax rate reduces the tax base via profit shifting by 0.8%.  
 
Losses and loss carry forward 
To be able to simulate the impact of loss consolidation, CORTAX contains a simple but straightforward 
modelling of aggregate losses by firms. We introduce random shocks in output or, equivalently, in the 
value  of  sales.  Sales  are  high  in  the  good  outcome  which  generates  positive  profits.  However, 
profitability is negative in the bad outcome with limited sales. Hence, ex-post there are both profit 
making  firms  and  loss  making  firms.  We  assume  that  firms  are  risk  neutral.  They  decide  on  their 
optimal levels of investment, employment, debt, and transfer prices before knowing whether they are 
subject to a negative shock. Hence, they base their input decisions on expected sales and expected 
marginal productivities. The probabilities of profit and loss are assumed to be independent and not 
correlated between years. Table A1 in appendix A shows ORBIS micro data about loss probabilities and 
the ratio of loss/profit in EU countries. The average loss probability is approximately 0.2, i.e. 20% of all 
firms  with unconsolidated accounts  make a loss each  year.  The average ratio of loss/profit equals 
approximately one. In the simulations, we use these averages to assess the impact of loss consolidation. 
In section 7.2, we consider a sensitivity analysis and pay attention to country-specific variations. 
 
In today’s corporate tax regimes in Europe, losses can be carried forward and offset against future 
profits within the same country. Yet, losses are generally treated asymmetrically from profits in two 
respects. First, there are several limitations to loss offset: losses can usually only be set off against 
taxable profits within the same income category; some countries put a cap on losses that can be offset 
each year; if a loss making companies were taken over, restrictions to loss carry forwards would apply; 
and the number of years for which losses can be carried forward is usually restricted. These limitations 
imply that some losses dry up and cannot be used. Second, firms can only carry forward nominal losses, 
i.e. without indexation. Due to discounting, its value declines over time.  
 
In CORTAX, we adopt a simple first-order approach to capture the limitations to loss offset in current 
systems. In particular, we assume that losses can be carried forward only one year. If the company 
makes a loss in two consecutive years, the first-year loss dries up and cannot be offset against profits in 
the future. This is obviously not a proper reflection of the complex and diverse treatment of losses in EU 
tax systems. On the one hand, it may overstate restrictions to loss offset since the period of loss carry 
forward is generally longer while some countries also allow loss carry backward. On the other hand, it 
may  underestimate  the  restrictions  to  loss  offset  as  loss  probabilities  in  consecutive  years  may  be 
correlated, which increases the probability of dry up. What matters in the CORTAX simulations is the   12 
quantitative size of the restrictions to loss offset. As we may either under or overestimate this, section 7 
performs a sensitivity analysis to our assumptions. 
 
Equilibrium and welfare 
Equilibrium  must  hold  on  each  market.  On  the  goods  market,  a  homogenous  good  is  traded  on  a 
perfectly competitive world market. Thereby, countries cannot exert market power so that the terms of 
trade is fixed. On asset markets, bonds and equity of different origins are perfect substitutes and are 
freely traded on world markets so that returns are fixed for individual countries. Debt and equity are 
imperfect substitutes. The current account matches the change in the net foreign asset position for each 
country (including rest of the world), due to Walras law. As labour is immobile internationally, wages 
are determined nationally on competitive labour markets.  
We compute the compensating variation to measure the welfare effects of policy changes. It is equal to 
the transfer that should be provided to households to maintain their utility at the pre-reform level. A 
positive compensating variation implies a welfare loss. In presenting the welfare effects of reforms, we 
put a minus for the compensating variation so that a positive value denotes an increase in welfare. We 
express the welfare effect in terms of GDP. 
 
Values and limitations of our approach 
CORTAX is valuable for economic policy analysis as it combines three vital properties: theoretical 
rigour, empirical validity and institutional detail of corporate tax systems. Theoretical rigour implies that 
behavioural margins of firms and households are derived from microeconomic optimisation. This allows 
for easy interpretation of the results. The general equilibrium setting implies that feedback effects of 
policies through market responses are included, such as via the labour market. Exploring policies in 
such a comprehensive and consistent framework offers potentially important insights for policy makers. 
The empirical validation is reflected in share parameters that make the model replicate true economic 
data in the EU. This adds to the realism of the model. Moreover, by using available empirical evidence 
on behavioural responses, the model assesses the relative strength of various effects to tax reforms and, 
therefore,  their  economic  and  welfare  effects.  By  quantifying  different  sides  of  relevant  trade-offs, 
CORTAX is particularly relevant for policy makers. 
Yet, the CGE approach also suffers from limitations. Although assumptions in the model are based on 
the best-possible empirical information and widely accepted economic theories, it is still a simplified 
description of the real world. For instance, CORTAX ignores certain economic mechanisms, includes 
specifications that are not undisputed, and cannot take away the uncertainty about the strength of certain 
behavioural effects to tax policies.  
We discuss four features of CORTAX that are particularly important to keep in mind when interpreting 
the outcomes. The first issue is the treatment of risk. The model distinguishes between debt and equity 
and assumes different rates of return for these two assets, which is consistent with ex-post returns in real 
world observations. The equity returns contain a risk premium, however, which forms a compensation 
for the higher uncertainty of equity stakes as compared to risk-free government bonds. CORTAX does 
not  explicitly  model  risk  and  thus  ignores  the  uncertainty  cost  of  holding  equity.  In  fact,  the  CES 
function for the asset portfolio of households is an imperfect shortcut to obtain an interior solution for 
household asset portfolios, but does not account for the cost of risk taking.    13 
Second, CORTAX does not consider distributional concerns. While various taxes in the model cause 
distortions in investment and labour supply, there is no explicit underlying distributional reason why the 
government does this. Indeed, the optimal tax structure in the model would be to simply raise lump-sum 
taxes and eliminate all other taxes. One therefore needs to be careful in interpreting simulations where 
the tax burden is shifted from distortionary taxes to lump-sum taxes, or between different distortionary 
taxes, as this may have distributional implications which are overlooked. 
Third, CORTAX assumes one homogenous good. The price of this good is determined on a competitive 
world market on which no country can exert market power. Therefore, the terms of trade is fixed for all 
countries. Reforms may well affect world markets, especially when the EU implements reforms jointly.  
Finally, CORTAX assumes a competitive labour market. This is an unrealistic description of European 
labour-markets, which are characterised by equilibrium unemployment. Bettendorf et al. (2009) explore 
how labour-market imperfections modify the impact of corporate tax changes on the economy via its 
effect on structural unemployment. They find that the cost of capital is an important determinant of the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Therefore, policies that reduce the cost of capital can help to fight 
European unemployment. It magnifies the positive welfare impact of these policies. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the parameters determining the impact on equilibrium unemployment. In 
light of this uncertainty, we decided to assume a competitive labour market in our analysis. 
Such caveats make us aware of the limitations of the CGE model. Yet, the consistency of the CORTAX 
framework  offers  common  ground  for  a  structured  discussion  about  both  the  assumptions  and  the 
economic implications of corporate tax reforms. Sensitivity analysis further facilitates this by offering 
insight in how changes in certain assumptions affect the conclusions.  
 
4. A common consolidated corporate tax base 
The European Commission proposal for a CCCTB consists of two parts: a common corporate tax base 
(CCTB)  and  consolidation  with  formula  apportionment  (CFA).  This  section  analyses  the  economic 
implications  of  both  parts.  Extensive  results  for  individual  countries  are  reported  in  tables  in  the 
Appendix. In the text, we summarise the main findings. 
4.1. A common corporate tax base 
We  first  consider  the  impact  of  a  common  corporate  tax  base  in  the  EU  (CCTB). It  consists  of  a 
common set of rules regarding fiscal depreciation, loss offset and tax incentives. In our simulations, we 
consider common rules that produce a tax base equal to the aggregate base generated by the regimes 
currently in place.
7 Hence, some countries broaden their tax base while others narrow it. The common 
base applies to both multinationals and domestic firms. If tax revenues change in a country due to 
changes in the corporate tax base we adjust, respectively, lump-sum transfers, corporate tax rates or 
labour taxes to balance the government budget. Table 3 shows the aggregate economic impact of the 
CCTB  for  the  EU  as  whole.  The  welfare  effects  for  individual  countries  under  lump  sum  revenue 
                                                            
7 This choice of the common base differs from the proposal by the European Commission, which involves a net broadening of the corporate tax bases 
in Europe in combination with a reduction in corporate tax rates (see e.g. CCCTB Working Group, 2007; Spengel and Oestreicher, 2007).    14 
recycling are presented in Figure 1. Figure 2 compares these outcomes to those under the alternative 
balanced budget rules. 
 
Table 3: Economic effects for the EU of a common corporate tax base 
  Lump-sum transfers  Corporate tax rate  Labour tax rate 
Corporate tax-to-gdp ratio  0.00  -0.03  0.00 
Cost of capital  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Investment  0.22  0.20  0.19 
Wage  0.10  0.08  0.10 
Employment  0.03  0.03  0.00 
GDP  0.09  0.10  0.07 
Welfare  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
We see from Table 3 that the aggregate welfare effect of the common base is small under each balanced 
budget rule: welfare in Europe rises by a mere 0.01% of EU27-GDP. The small welfare gain is due to a 
smaller variation of effective marginal tax rates across countries. Indeed, the coefficient of variation of 
EMTRs declines from 0.63 today to 0.50 under the CCTB. The smaller dispersion of EMTRs reduces 
distortions in the allocation of mobile capital across countries. Intuitively, capital mobility equalises 
after-tax rates of return. If EMTRs differ across countries, this implies that before-tax rates of return 
must differ. It reflects the distortion in capital export neutrality. Convergence of marginal effective tax 
rates mitigates this distortion as capital relocates from countries with a low before-tax return to countries 
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Figure 1: Welfare effects of a common corporate tax base, lump sum balanced budget rule 
 
Figure 1 shows that the welfare implications of the CCTB differ considerably across countries. On the 
horizontal axis is the initial net present value of depreciation allowances, expressed as a share of the 
purchase price of an investment. Hence, countries with a broad initial base are positioned left in the 
Figure and countries with a narrow base right. On the vertical axis is the welfare effect induced by the 
introduction of the common European base. Figure 1 reveals that countries that narrow their tax base by 
means of more generous depreciation allowances under the common base rules experience a welfare 
gain. This is because the narrower tax base reduces the cost of capital so that investment expands. More 
investment raises the productivity of labour and is accompanied by  higher  wages. This encourages 
labour supply so that employment expands. The increase in investment and employment lead to a higher 
level of GDP. Due to smaller distortions in investment and labour supply, welfare ultimately increases 
up to almost 0.4% of GDP in Poland and Spain. Countries that gain in the top-left corner of Figure 1 
include also Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Austria and Czech Republic. In contrast, countries that broaden 
their  base  via  less  generous  allowances  for  investment  experience  opposite  effects.  This  applies  to 
Estonia,  Lithuania,  Denmark  and  France  among  others.  Belgium  is  an  outlier  in  Figure  1.  It  loses 
considerably due to the abolition of its ACE system, which raises the cost of capital substantially. Its 
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Figure 2: Welfare effects of a common corporate tax base, alternative balanced budget rules 
 
Figure 2 shows how the welfare effects for countries change if governments use distortionary taxes on 
labour or corporate income to balance their budget, instead of lump sum taxes. Thereby, countries are 
ranked according to the value of their depreciation allowances for tax purposes (from low on the left to   16 
high on the right). In the figure, points are linked through lines to facilitate comparison between the 
three simulations. Figure 2 shows that the adjustment via distortionary taxes does not change the sign of 
the effect for individual countries, but it results in a flattening of the effects of the CCTB. Hence, 
countries that narrow their base still benefit from the reduction in the cost of capital. Yet, the welfare 
effects are smaller due to higher distortionary taxes which are necessary after the narrowing of the 
corporate tax base. Countries broadening their base use the extra funds to cut distortionary taxes. This 
mitigates the adverse implications of the higher cost of capital induced by base broadening.  
4.2. Consolidation with formula apportionment 
To avoid mixing-up the welfare effects of a common tax base and the welfare effect of consolidation 
with formula apportionment (CFA), this subsection takes the common base as a starting point. The 
effects of CFA are thus assessed relative to a European common corporate tax base. As in the previous 
simulation, we assume that governments adjust lump-sum transfers, corporate tax rates or labour taxes 
to balance their budget if revenues change due to the reform.  
 
CFA means for a multinational that the tax bases of the parent and its subsidiaries are added into one 
aggregate. This tax base is apportioned to the participating countries by using a prescribed formula. In 
particular, the share of the tax base of firm i allocated to country j equals: 
 











Y denote the formula factors adding up to one: w
L + w
K + w
Y = 1. Xij denotes the 
share  of  multinational  i’s  factor  Xi  that  is  operational  in  country  j,  where  X  =  L,  K,  Y  reflect, 
respectively, employment, assets and sales. In our simulations, we consider the origin of the sales (i.e. in 
the jurisdiction in which the good or service is produced) as we have no information to identify the 
destination of final sales (where the final consumer resides: see section 5 for a discussion). The weights 
in the formula are fixed for all countries and determined at the supranational level. This section shows 
the impact of CFA with a formula of 1/3 for employment, assets and output. The apportioned profits are 
taxed at national corporate tax rates. These rates remain unchanged as compared to the situation in 2007, 
unless indicated otherwise.  
 
CFA exerts a direct effect on the distribution of the corporate tax base between countries, i.e. even 
without behavioural responses by firms. We first discuss these direct revenue effects. Subsequently, we 
explore the behavioural consequences of CFA and the corresponding economic effects. 
 
4.2.1. Direct effects on corporate tax revenue 
The  introduction  of  CFA  affects  corporate  tax  revenue  in  European  countries  for  two  reasons: 
reallocation and loss consolidation. First, CFA modifies the distribution of the European corporate tax 
base between Member States. A number of studies assess these distributional effects by using micro data   17 
from firm accounts (see e.g. Fuest et al., 2007; Devereux and Loretz, 2008). They report a substantial 
reallocation of revenue, depending on the choice of the apportionment formula. In CORTAX, the direct 
reallocation  of  the  corporate  tax  base  is  governed  by  national  accounts  data  from  Eurostat,  which 
determine country-specific shares in the formula.  
 
Second,  loss  consolidation  affects  the  tax  burden  of  multinationals.  There  are  a  number  of 
considerations when comparing a system of loss-carry forward within each country to a system with 
immediate cross-border loss offset. To completely model the different treatment of losses one would 
need to simulate a number of periods with different potential outcomes. Further, it would be necessary 
to consider each possible outcome in each country simultaneously. For example, if there are even only 
two possible outcomes  in each period (profit or loss), across 27 EU Member  states in  which each 
individual company is active, we would need to consider 2
27 different states in each period. However, 
we can consider the basic mechanisms in a two-country framework with two – one positive and one 
negative – outcomes. To understand the impact of a switch to a cross-border loss consolidation system it 
is useful first to consider the impact of uncertainty on the expected tax burden under a loss carry-
forward system. For simplicity, consider a firm with an investment with two possible outcomes: with 
probability p it creates a profit of g and with the probability (1-p) it creates a loss of b<0. Hence the 
expected profit is E= pg+ (1-p)b. In the event of a profit, the firm faces a tax liability of tg. In the event 
of a loss, it generally cannot claim an immediate tax rebate, but must carry forward the loss to set 
against profits  in a subsequent period. Given a discount  factor of 0<d<1, the present value of the 
reduction in tax due to the loss is tbd. We can define an “effective expected tax liability” under this 
system as T = t[pg + (1-p)bd]. Dividing by expected profit yields an “effective expected tax rate”, 
y=T/E. Given that b<0 and d<1, then y>t: the effective tax rate exceeds the statutory rate. This is true as 
long as there is some possibility of a loss which would not receive an immediate tax rebate (p<1). The 
extent by which y exceeds t increases the further into the future that the loss must be carried forward. 
The extent to which y exceeds t represents a greater disincentive to investment relative to the case of a 
symmetric tax system (in which y=t). For a given level of uncertainty, an increase in profitability tends 
to increase T, but lower y. For example a smaller b, holding p and g constant, implies that a smaller 
taxable loss would need to be carried forward in the event of a loss. Further, given a level of expected 
profit, higher uncertainty is associated with a larger y. For example, an increase in g with an equal but 
offsetting reduction in b, holding p constant so that E is unchanged, would result in a higher T and a 
higher y.  
 
Now consider the case of a system of loss consolidation between two countries, i and j, where each 
country hosts a similar investment which may make a profit or loss. Assume for simplicity that each 
country has an equal apportionment, so that the effective statutory rate is t*=0.5(ti+tj). If we assume that 
g>b in each country, then the probability that aggregate taxable profit is negative is p*=(1-pi)(1-pj): this 
implies that there is a lower probability of a taxable loss which would need to be carried forward than in 
the case without loss consolidation. This implies that the disincentive to investment arising form the 
asymmetric treatment of profit and loss is lower than in the case without loss consolidation. These 
observations imply two effects of an introduction of a loss consolidation system. First, for a given 
expected profit, since the country with the more uncertain outcome gains more in expected tax revenues 
in the absence of consolidation, it would lose more than the other country if loss consolidation were   18 
introduced. Second, for given levels of uncertainty, the country with the higher profit would lose more 
revenue when consolidated with the profits or losses in the other country. The effect on the distortion to 
investment also depends on tax rates. If tax rates differ across countries, it is possible that offsetting 
losses in a high tax country against profit in a low tax country may increase the effective tax liability on 
the firm. This is because is because it is possible that the present value of losses carried forward (say 
tibid if the loss is incurred in country i) exceeds the value of losses immediately offset under formula 
apportionment (t*bi). 
 
In our simulations, we make a first-order approximation of the impact of loss consolidation on revenues 
by assuming that all losses that occur in European subsidiaries can be offset by profits elsewhere under 
consolidation. Under loss carry forward, firms that make a loss in two consecutive periods cannot offset 
the loss of the first period. Moreover, losses that can be offset are discounted one period. Hence, loss 
consolidation in CORTAX will always reduce the tax burden of the multinational relative to loss carry 
forward.  To  illustrate  the  underlying  mechanism,  the  following  example  shows  the  impact  of  loss 
consolidation on the corporate tax base in CORTAX. Suppose there are 100 firms. Among them, 80 
make a profit of 1000 and 20 make a loss of 1000. The total taxable base of profit making firms is 
therefore 80 000 if the losses cannot be offset and 60 000 if losses are offset immediately. Under loss 
consolidation, the tax base is thus 25% smaller. As the tax reduction applies only to multinational firms, 
we multiply this by the share of multinationals in the economy, which is approximately 60% in Europe. 
Consolidation would then reduce the corporate tax burden by 15%.
8 In the steady state equilibrium of 
CORTAX, the reduction  in  the tax base is smaller due to losses carried forward from the past. In 
CORTAX, 80% of the previous-period losses (i.e. the probability of profit) can be offset against profits 
in the next period. In our example, this equals a loss compensation of 16 000. Yet, this compensation 
needs to be discounted at, say 5% interest, which reduces its current value to 15200. Compared to 
immediate loss offset under consolidation of 20 000, the value of losses decreases by 4 800. It implies a 
reduction of the corporate tax base by 4 800 / 64 800 = 7.5% when moving from loss carry forward to 
loss consolidation. Assuming a share of multinationals of 60% of all companies, the aggregate decline in 
the tax base in the steady state would be 4.5%. 
 
Figure 3 shows the direct impact of CFA with the 1/3 formula on corporate tax-to-GDP ratios according 
to CORTAX. Countries are ranked according to their capital/labour ratio from left (lowest) to right 
(highest). This capital/labour ratio explains part of the country differences (see below). On aggregate for 
the EU, the reduction in corporate tax revenue is 0.17% of GDP (see the dotted line in Figure 3) or 
nearly  5%  of  corporate  tax  revenues,  which  is  due  to  loss  consolidation.  The  effect  for  individual 
countries is partly the result of a differential impact of loss consolidation. In particular, the reduction in 
revenue due to loss consolidation is larger for countries featuring a high corporate tax rate and a large 
multinational sector. 
  
The redistribution effect of formula apportionment depends on three factors. First, the capital/labour 
ratio determines the extent to which the asset factor relative to the employment factor influences the 
division of the corporate tax base across countries. Figure 3 shows that labour-intensive countries (on 
                                                            
8 Fuest, et al (2007) estimate this impact and find a decline in the tax base of 20% using data on German multinationals. ORBIS suggests that the 
share of multinationals in Germany is 70%. It would imply a direct reduction of 17.5% in Germany.   19 
the left-hand side of Figure 3) are more likely to gain from CFA under the 1/3 formula than the capital-
intensive countries (on the right-hand side). For instance, Portugal gains because of its high labour 
intensity of production, while Germany loses due to its capital-intensive production. Second, the current 
corporate  tax  rate  determines  whether  a  country  initially  benefits  or  loses  from  profit  shifting.  In 
particular, low-tax countries like Ireland initially gain and high-tax countries like Belgium initially lose. 
Eliminating  profit  shifting  takes  away  these  benefits  or  losses.  Third,  CFA  matters  only  for 
multinationals. Hence, countries with a large multinational sector are affected more than countries with 
a small multinational sector. The Netherlands and Ireland lose between 0.4% and 0.5% of GDP because 
they combine a large multinational sector with a relatively low tax rate and a high capital/labour ratio. 






































Figure 3: Direct impact of CFA (with ⅓ formula) on corporate tax-to-gdp ratios 
 
4.2.2. Economic effects 
CFA affects economic behaviour in CORTAX through four main channels. First, multinationals can no 
longer shift profits to subsidiaries within Europe. Indeed, profits are consolidated so that transfer prices 
are  no  longer  needed.  The  elimination  of  profit  shifting  reduces  corporate  tax  revenue  in  low-tax 
countries that currently benefit from it and raises revenue in high-tax countries (see Figure 2). However, 
profit shifting is not a zero-sum game in CORTAX (see also Hong and Smart, 2007). The reason is that 
profit shifting allows multinationals to reduce their overall tax burden. This reduces the cost of capital, 
encourages investment and boosts GDP. Taking away this opportunity effectively raises the tax burden 
for multinationals and exerts opposite effects on the economy. Note that profit shifting vis a vis the US 
and  Japan  remains  as  it  is,  i.e.  based  on  separate  accounting.  In  determining  transfer  prices,   20 
multinationals take the weighted average European rate into account (see eq. (2) below) as the relevant 
tax rate applying to profits allocated in the EU.  
 
The second effect of CFA involves the EMTR or cost of capital. With separate accounting, national 
corporate tax rates based on the source principle affect the cost of capital for subsidiaries in countries 
where they operate. Under consolidation,  however, the cost of capital is  not directly influenced by 
national  tax  rates.  The  reason  is  that  the  income  generated  by  a  multinational  is  summed  up  to  a 
consolidated base. The location of investment thus does not matter for the tax base of the multinational. 
The tax rate applying to the profit of the multinational under CFA (τi
cfa) can be written as a weighted 





τ ω τ =∑               (2) 
where  firm-specific  weights  ωij  are  determined  by  expression  (1).  CFA  thus  effectively  means  an 
equalisation of EMTRs. Countries with a low EMTR thus lose their competitive advantage in attracting 
mobile capital compared to countries with a high EMTR. 
 
But CFA does cause distortions in  factor allocation. This third effect  is opposite to the second. In 
particular, under CFA, multinationals can change the shares ωij in expression (2), thereby affecting the 
tax burden applying to the entire multinational profit. Indeed, by relocating inputs appearing in formula 
(1) from high-tax to low-tax countries, firms reduce the weight of high-countries and increase the weight 
of  low-tax  countries.  This  reduces  the  tax  burden  τi
cfa.  Hence,  formula  apportionment  induces  new 
behavioural  distortions  as  long  as  corporate  tax  rates  differ  across  countries.  Effectively,  statutory 
corporate  tax  rates  become  excises  on  the  factors  that  appear  in  the  formula.  Thus,  formula 
apportionment replaces the current distortion in capital and profit allocation by a new distortion that 
depends on the formula factors. CORTAX sheds light on whether this improves allocative efficiency or 
not and which countries benefit and lose. 




Box: Incentives under loss consolidation and loss carry forward 
Assume a firm that produces output by combining labour and capital. Ex-ante, firms are equal. Ex-
post, they may suffer a random shock in the value of sales. In the good outcome, the revenue from 
sales equals Yt
g. In the bad outcome, there is a lower value Yt
b, such that profits are negative. Ex-
post, a share of q firms obtain a good outcome and a share 1-q obtains a bad outcome. Assuming 
risk neutrality, firms consider the expected output value when determining their demand for inputs. 
Under loss carry forward, firms cannot immediately offset losses. We assume they carry forward 
their loss one year and then offset it against a possible profit. The expected tax base is determined 
by profitable firms minus the taxable loss they carry from the previous year (Λt) 
1
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where wLt denote labour costs, It is investment and ø stands for an investment tax credit.  
Under  loss  consolidation,  we  assume  that  all  losses  can  be  immediately  offset  against  profits 
elsewhere in the multinational group. The expected aggregate corporate tax base is  
( ) (1 )
C g b
t t t t t E qY q Y wL I ϕ Π = + − − −              (4) 
The difference in tax bases between consolidation and loss carry forward is: 
( ) ( ) (1 )[ ] 0
C L b
t t t t t E E Y wL I θ ϕ Π − Π = − − − <            (5) 
where  ( ) ( ) 1 1 / 1 1 q q r θ = + − + ≤     .  Hence, the tax base is unambiguously smaller under 
consolidation.  
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where subscripts denote marginal productivities, r is the return to equity, τ is the corporate tax rate 
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g b
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Expressions (6) to (9) show that firms set the expected marginal productivity of capital and labour 
equal to their respective prices. According to (8), the corporate tax raises the cost of capital as long 
as investment is not fully deductible, i.e. ø<1. The first-order conditions in (6) and (7) differ from 
(8) and (9) due to the second term on the RHS in (6) and (7). Comparing (7) and (9) shows that 
consolidation unambiguously reduces labour costs, because 
b
L w Y > . Intuitively, limited loss offset 
implies that part of labour costs cannot be deducted if a firm makes a loss in two consecutive bad 
years. Comparing (6) and (8) shows that consolidation may raise or reduce the cost of capital as 
compared to loss carry forward. This depends on the corporate tax system: if only a small share of 
investments are deductible (i.e. if ø is small), the reduced taxation of production in bad outcomes 
b
K Y  implies a reduction in the cost of capital. If ø is larger, consolidation raises the cost of capital 
because returns in consecutive bad outcomes will be untaxed as well.   22 
The fourth effect of CFA is due to loss consolidation. The box ‘Incentives under loss consolidation and 
loss carry forward’ demonstrates how loss consolidation affects relative prices in CORTAX. It suggests 
that loss consolidation reduces the effective labour costs. This is because wages are always directly 
deductible from the multinationals´ corporate tax bill in the CFA-regime, which is not the case under 
loss carry forward. Loss consolidation does not necessarily reduce the cost of capital though. On the one 
hand, deductible capital costs become more valuable under consolidation as such costs can be deducted 
earlier  and  always.  On  the  other  hand,  any  positive  marginal  returns  on  investment  are  taxed 
immediately and cannot be postponed or waved in case of a loss. This increases the cost of capital. The 
CORTAX simulations reveal how in different countries the costs of labour and capital are affected. This 
drives the impact on employment and investment. 
 
Table 4 shows the balance of these four effects according to CORTAX under three balanced budget 
rules: lump-sum taxes, corporate taxes and labour taxes. The first column of Table 4 shows that CFA 
improves welfare in Europe by 0.08% of GDP under lump sum adjustment. The cost of capital falls by 
0.05%-point  and  investment  rises  by  0.38%.  Employment  and  GDP  expand  by  0.17%  and  0.18%, 
respectively. The aggregate welfare gain from CFA in the first column of Table 4 is mainly driven by 
loss consolidation. Indeed, the lower tax burden implies a reduction in labour costs and the cost of 
capital. As this is financed by lump-sum taxation, it creates a net welfare gain.  
 
However, if other distortionary taxes are used to balance the government budget, the second and third 
columns of Table 4 show that the positive economic effects of CFA are smaller. Higher corporate tax 
rates  are  particularly  harmful  for  investment  as  they  raise  the  cost  of  capital.  Higher  labour  taxes 
especially hurt labour supply incentives and reduce employment. The welfare gain of CFA drops under 
both simulations. 
 
Table 4: Economic effects for the EU of consolidation with formula apportionment 
  Lump-sum transfers  Corporate tax rate  Labour tax rate 
Corporate tax-to-gdp ratio  -0.29  -0.11  -0.30 
Cost of capital  -0.05  -0.02  -0.05 
Investment  0.38  -0.13  0.23 
Wage  0.41  0.20  0.42 
Employment  0.17  0.09  0.02 
GDP  0.18  -0.06  0.03 
Welfare  0.08  0.02  -0.03 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 4 shows the welfare effects for individual countries under lump sum adjustment. The horizontal 
axis shows the initial capital/labour ratio in CORTAX. We see that welfare increases in most countries. 
Hence, while a number of countries face a direct reduction in corporate tax revenue (see Figure 3), the 
resulting welfare effects are more favourable. For instance, we see that Ireland realises a small welfare 
gain,  despite  that  corporate  tax  revenue  falls  substantially  due  to  the  abolition  of  profit  shifting. 
Intuitively, Ireland’s low corporate income tax now attracts substantial capital instead of paper profits. 
The  opposite  occurs  in  Belgium  where  the  high  corporate  tax  rate  mitigates  the  benefits  from   23 
consolidation.  For  other  countries,  the  balance  of  the  two  offsetting  mechanisms  depends  on  the 
economic structure, country-specific elasticities and the level of corporate tax rates. Eastern European 
countries  with  small capital/labour ratios gain  most  from consolidation and formula apportionment. 
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Figure 4 Welfare effect of CFA for different countries 
 
The gains and losses are more dispersed if governments adjust distortionary taxes on labour or capital 
income instead of lump-sum transfers, see figure 5. Capital-intensive countries need to raise tax rates 
more  to  compensate  their  revenue  loss  induced  by  loss  consolidation.  This  reduces  their  welfare. 
Labour-intensive countries are more likely to reduce tax rates, as they gain revenue under CFA. Hence, 
they experience larger welfare gains if distortionary taxes are reduced.  
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Figure 5 Welfare effect of CFA for different countries, alternative balanced budget rules 
 
5. Choice of the apportionment formula 
The  direct  distributional  and  economic  effects  of  CFA  depend  on  the  choice  of  the  apportionment 
formula. This section shows this by exploring the effects of CFA under four pure formulas, based on 
employment, payroll, assets or output. As in the previous section, we assess the impact of CFA relative 
to a scenario with a CCTB in the EU. If revenues change due to a CFA reform, we assume that a 
country adjusts corporate tax rates to balance its budget. The relative performance of different formulas 
does not change if we adopt alternative balanced budget rules. The outcomes for individual countries are 
given in the appendix. Table 5 summarises the economic effects for the EU as a whole.  
 
Table  5:  Economic  effects  of  CFA  for  the  EU  under  alternative  formulas,  corporate  tax  rate 
adjustment 
      employment  payroll  capital  production  equal shares 
 CIT revenues    -0.15  -0.10  -0.11  -0.10  -0.11 
 Cost of capital    -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
 Investment    -0.11  -0.15  -0.13  -0.19  -0.13 
 Wage    0.30  0.19  0.17  0.16  0.20 
Employment    0.09  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.09 
GDP    -0.15  -0.04  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06 
Welfare    0.00  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
  Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 5 suggests that the choice of the formula matters marginally for aggregate welfare in Europe. The 
reason  is  that  the  economic  effects  are  driven  primarily  by  the  tax  relief  associated  with  loss 
consolidation. This is on average independent of the formula choice. What we see is that the welfare 
gains  are  slightly  larger  under  the  pure  payroll  and  production  formulas  as  compared  to  the  pure 
employment and capital formulas. The reason is that wages and the value of production both depend on 
the size of the fixed factor. This part of the apportionment formula is non-distortionary and, therefore, 
formulas based on it are less distortionary. Employment and assets do not directly depend on the fixed 
factor. Hence, these formulas are slightly more distortionary and yield smaller welfare gains.  
5.1. Employment formula 
Figure 6 presents the direct impact of CFA under a pure employment formula on the corporate-tax-to-
gdp ratio (dotted line) and the general-equilibrium impact on welfare (solid line) in different countries if 
corporate tax rates are used to balance the budget. The figure reveals a negative correlation of the 
welfare effects with the initial capital/labour ratio (on the horizontal axis). Hence, poor labour-intensive 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe benefit more from CFA than the rich capital-intensive countries 
in Western Europe.
9 First, the initial redistribution of the tax base is more favourable as a large share is 
apportioned  to  labour-intensive  countries.  Second,  low  tax  rates  are  more  effective  in  attracting 
multinational activity if the formula is determined by the relatively abundant factor. Especially Bulgaria 
and  Romania  benefit,  as  they  combine  a  labour-intensive  production  structure  with  relatively  low 
corporate tax rates. The most capital-intensive countries, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, suffer a 





                                                            
9 This is in line with the findings of Devereux and Loretz (2008).  




































Figure  6  Effect  on  corporate  tax-to-gdp  ratio  and  welfare  of  CFA  with  a  pure  employment 
formula 
 
5.2. Asset formula 
Figure 7 demonstrates the effects of CFA under a pure asset formula. It reveals the direct impact on the 
corporate-tax-to-gdp ratio (dotted line) and general-equilibrium change in welfare (solid line) under 
corporate  tax  rate  adjustment.  Under  a  pure  asset  formula,  capital-intensive  countries  benefit  from 
receiving a relatively large share of the European tax base of multinationals. Moreover, a pure asset 
formula  implies  that  the  corporate  tax  rate  has  a  relatively  large  effect  on  the  asset  allocation  of 
multinationals. Capital-intensive countries with a low corporate tax rate therefore benefit most from 
CFA with the asset formula and labour-intensive countries with high tax rates lose. Figure 7 shows the 
positive correlation between the welfare effect of CFA and the initial capital/labour ratio. Interesting is 
that Ireland and the Netherlands experience a lower corporate tax-to-gdp ratio due to the abolition of 
profit shifting, although this effect is smaller than under the 1/3 formula. Yet, the welfare effect in these 
countries is positive because multinationals relocate their assets due to relatively low corporate tax rates.  


































Figure 7 Effect on corporate tax-to-gdp ratio and welfare of CFA with a pure asset formula 
 
When comparing Figures 6 and 7, we see that the variation of the welfare effects across countries is 
larger under the employment formula than under the asset formula (compare the scale of the vertical 
axis). The reason is that distortions induced by the current corporate tax systems are more similar to the 
distortions under CFA with a pure asset formula. Under a pure employment formula, distortions in 
response to the formula are more different as employment multinationals is more weakly linked to the 
current distribution of profits. Given the uneven distribution of labour, abundant in low-wage countries 
but scarce in high-wage countries, the effects for individual countries vary more under the employment 
formula than under the asset formula.  
5.3. Payroll, production and sales formulas 
Applying the source principle of taxation is difficult in practice, both under separate accounting and 
under consolidation with formula apportionment. This is due to the complex structures of multinational 
activities, which render it virtually impossible to determine the source of profits. Under consolidation, 
one may approximate the source of profits by using input factors in the formula. Indeed, employment, 
assets  and  output  approximate  the  source  of  where  profits  are  generated  and  thus  come  close  to 
achieving taxation on the basis of the source principle.  
 
An alternative is the destination principle, i.e. the destination of sales of final products where consumers 
reside. In the US, sales have become the most popular formula. Also in the European debate sales are   28 
generally considered as a potential apportionment formula under the CCCTB. In this debate the usual 
measurement of sales is by destination. That is, if a company in country X exports its output to country 
Y, then  the sale is  in country Y.  This  makes the tax on profit  much closer to a destination-based 
consumption tax. If  sales by destination  were the only  factor in the apportionment formula, then  a 
company’s tax liability would not depend on where it undertook any of its activities other than the sale 
to the final consumer. It follows that the tax system would not distort decisions as to the location of 
productive activity, headquarters or other aspects of the company’s operations. It is for these reasons 
that there have been independent proposals to base the corporation tax system on a destination basis 
(Bond and Devereux, 2002, Auerbach et al, 2009).  
 
However, we are not able to analyze the CCCTB under a sales-by-destination formula. This is because 
we do not have reliable data on the link between production and sales. In order to implement this, we 
would need information on the geographical scope of sales by subsidiaries of multinational companies. 
Such data are not currently available.  
 
6. Corporate tax rates 
In the European CCCTB proposal, countries are free to choose their own corporate tax rate. This leaves 
room  for  tax  competition  between  countries  with  respect  to  rates.  Indeed,  we  have  seen  that 
apportionment based on employment, assets or payroll induces multinationals to reallocate factors to 
low-tax jurisdictions. Governments may strategically respond by setting low tax rates in order to attract 
these multinational factors. An important question for policy is whether tax competition becomes more 
or less intense under CFA as compared to separate accounting.  
6.1. Tax competition under consolidation 
The effects of moving to CFA on tax competition are theoretically ambiguous, see e.g. Pethig and 
Wagener (2003), Sørensen (2004b) and Kind et al. (2005). It depends on the strength of international 
spillovers of tax policies. Governments under separate accounting have an incentive to underbid each 
other’s tax rates to attract paper profits, while with CFA they keep tax rates low to attract multinational 
activities (Gordon and Wilson, 1986). Which of these spillovers dominate remains an empirical issue. 
This section explores whether the incentives for tax competition under CFA are stronger than under 
separate accounting. To that end, we simulate a unilateral 5%-point reduction in the corporate tax rate in 
each EU country, both under the current regime of separate accounting (with a CCTB already in place) 
and under the CFA regime. In both simulations, governments reduce lump-sum transfers to balance their 
budget.  Hence,  the  corporate  tax  relief  typically  improves  welfare  by  alleviating  distortions  in 
investment. On average, welfare in a country increases by 0.2% of GDP. The interesting question is 
whether these welfare improvements differ across the two regimes. If this is the case, it suggests that 
spillovers differ in size. Indeed, if the same unilateral tax cut raises welfare more under CFA than under 
separate accounting, spillovers are larger under CFA and the incentives for tax competition are expected 
to intensify. 
   29 
The appendix shows the economic impact of a 5%-point unilateral corporate tax rate reduction for 
individual countries under separate accounting and CFA with a 1/3 formula. Figure 8 summarises the 
welfare effects under both regimes. In the figure, points are linked to each other via two lines: a dotted 
line  for the  CFA regime and a solid line  for the  separate accounting regime. Countries are ranked 
according to their initial corporate tax rate.
10 
 
On average, we find that the welfare effect of a unilateral tax reduction is equivalent across the two 
regimes. However, the effect differs between low-tax and high-tax countries. Indeed, Figure 8 shows 
that tax reductions yield larger welfare gains in low-tax countries under the CFA regime. In contrast, tax 
reductions in high-tax countries yield smaller welfare gains under the CFA regime. The explanation is 
the following. The costs of transfer price manipulation are convex. It implies that the marginal costs of 
profit shifting increases if a tax rate falls further relative to other countries. Hence, additional tax rate 
reductions in low-tax countries yield only small benefits because of the rapidly rising costs of profit 
shifting. In contrast, the marginal cost of profit shifting for high-tax countries are low. Hence, tax-rate 
reductions are relatively beneficial. Under the CFA regime, this asymmetry between high-tax countries 
and low-tax countries disappears because the profit shifting mechanism is absent. Instead, new fiscal 
spillovers arise that depend less on the initial tax rate. Therefore, low-tax countries find it relatively 
more and high-tax countries relatively less beneficial to cut their rates under the CFA regime. This 
finding suggests that under CFA, low-tax countries will find it more beneficial to cut their rates so that 
they more aggressively compete. High-tax countries find it less beneficial to reduce their rate. The likely 
result is a further divergence of corporate tax rates across countries. This makes the debate on rate 
harmonisation more relevant. 
 
                                                            
10 These outcomes are qualitatively the same if we take pure employment or asset formulas, although the distributional effects are different. In 
particular, low-tax countries in Eastern Europe will experience a considerably larger welfare gain from a unilateral tax rate reduction under a pure 





































Figure 8 Effect on 5%-point unilateral tax reduction on welfare under separate accounting (SA) 
and CFA 
6.2. Harmonisation of rates 
We simulate the welfare effects of rate harmonisation under the CCCTB. Important is the choice of the 
common tax rate in Europe. We choose a common rate of 32.5%, which implies the same impact on 
corporate  tax  revenues  as  the  CCCTB  with  today’s  corporate  tax  rates  in  Europe.  Changes  in  tax 
revenues are compensated with a change in either lump-sum transfers or the labour tax rate. Table 6 
compares the CCCTB with rate harmonisation at 32.5% with the CCCTB where corporate tax rates 
remain unchanged.  
 
Table 6: Economic effects for the EU of a CCCTB with country-specific and common corporate 
tax rate  
  No rate harmonisation (see Table 4)  Harmonisation at a common rate of 32.5% 
Budget closing rule  Lump-sum transfers  Labour tax  Lump-sum transfers  Labour tax 
CIT revenues  -0.29  -0.30  -0.32  -0.33 
Cost of capital  -0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02 
Investment  0.38  0.23  0.41  0.25 
Wage  0.41  0.42  0.51  0.52 
Employment  0.17  0.02  0.19  0.03 
GDP  0.18  0.03  0.28  0.13 
Welfare  0.08  -0.03  0.14  0.04 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 6 shows that welfare expands by about 0.14% and 0.04% of GDP if government budgets are 
closed with lump-sum transfers respectively labour taxes. Both are higher than with country-specific 
changes in the corporate tax rate (as repeated from table 4). It reflects the more efficient allocation of 
capital in the European Union due to the equalisation of tax rates. The allocation formula exerts no 
longer an effect on factor allocation when rates are harmonised. Hence, distortions in factor allocation 
are eliminated. This increases average rates of returns in Europe, which shows up in higher welfare.  
 
7. Sensitivity analysis 
The discussion of consolidation and formula apportionment has centred on the average welfare effect 
(generally negligible) and its distribution across countries (quite uneven). In addition, the distribution is 
shown to depend on initial tax rates, capital intensity and openness as measured by the size of the 
multinational sector. This section explores how robust these results are to alternative values of key 
elasticities and modelling assumptions. Section 7.1 shows that the economic effects of consolidation do 
not  depend  much  on  the  substitution  between  labour  and  capital  or  the  inclusion  of  responses  to 
dividend and capital gains taxes. More important are the size of the fixed factor, the responsiveness of 
paper profits to tax differentials and the inclusion of a discrete location choice of multinationals. The 
role of losses is discussed in section 7.2. 
7.1. Economic effects of consolidation under alternative assumptions 
This section presents  how sensitive our results are for a  number of assumptions in the  model. We 
consider one key reform proposal to illustrate the sensitivity of our results, namely the introduction of 
CFA with the 1/3 formula, where governments use corporate tax rates to balance their budget (see Table 
4). We consider the implications for this simulations under five changes in CORTAX: (i) a smaller 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  labour  and  capital  (from  0.7  to  0.5);  (ii)  a  different  assumption 
regarding  the  distortionary  impact  of  dividend  taxes;  (iii)  a  smaller  size  of  the  fixed  factor  in  the 
calibration (from 2.5% to 1.5%); (iv) a larger response of transfer prices to tax differences (50% larger 
response); and (v) the inclusion of discrete location choices between countries. Table 7 reports in the 
first column the EU-average change in welfare under the five alternative assumptions, and compares it 
with the outcomes from the basic simulation, presented in the first row of the table. Moreover, Table 7 
summarizes the sensitivity of individual country effects by means of covariances.
11 In particular, the 
first  row  shows  the  covariance  of  the  welfare  effect  of  the  CFA  reform  with  three  country 
characteristics: (i) the initial corporate tax rate; (ii) the capital intensity; and (iii) the degree of openness 
measured by FDI stocks. We see that the welfare effect is positively correlated with low corporate tax 
rates, low capital intensity and a small multinational sector (see section 4). Table 7 shows how these 




                                                            
11 A limitation of covariances is that they are sensitive to scaling, which implies that the columns in Table 7 cannot be compared. However, variation 
in the rows of the table reveals whether the initial tax rate, capital intensity and openess has a weaker or stronger impact on the welfare distribution.   32 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity of welfare effects of consolidation with formula apportionment (equal shares 
and corporate tax rate adjustment) 
  EU-average  covariance with 
    tax rate  capital intensity  openness 
CFA (base case)  0.02  -0.003  -0.193  -0.050 
Limited K-L substitution  0.03  -0.003  -0.192  -0.050 
No personal taxation  0.02  -0.004  -0.178  -0.046 
Smaller fixed factor  -0.02  -0.005  -0.367  -0.105 
Intensified paper profit shifting  0.02  -0.002  -0.230  -0.074 
Location choice  -0.05  -0.007  -0.414  -0.162 
 
The second row of Table 7 shows the welfare effects of CFA for a lower elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital. This elasticity is generally considered to be an important determinant of the 
economic effects of corporate tax reforms. In particular the response of investments to the user cost 
depends on this elasticity. Simulations with CORTAX in Bettendorf et al. (2006) show that a limitation 
of the substitution possibilities reduces the responsiveness of capital and GDP to a change in the tax 
rate. Table 7 shows that the welfare changes in the CFA-reform are negligible, however. The reason is 
that the economic and welfare changes are not induced by changes in the user cost of capital, but by 
changes in profit shifting and the (implicit) taxation of the apportionment factors. These tax planning 
strategies do not depend much on the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
 
The third row adopts an alternative assumption regarding the distortionary effect of personal taxes on 
capital income. In particular, CORTAX adopts the assumption under the old view of dividend taxation 
that personal capital taxes on capital affect the investment. In the third row of Table 7, we have taken 
the new view and assume that these taxes are not relevant for investment. We see that the welfare effects 
are very similar. Hence, the assumption of how personal taxes affect investments does not change the 
impact of CFA much. 
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Figure 9 Welfare effects of CFA, with a smaller share of fixed income 
 
The fourth row of Table 7 assumes a smaller fixed factor than in the original CORTAX version. This 
renders the corporate income tax more distortionary, as a smaller part applies to the non-distortionary 
economic rent. As a result, we find that CFA yields a welfare loss on average in the EU, rather than a 
welfare gain. The welfare loss is particularly pronounced in countries featuring high corporate tax rates, 
high capital intensity and a large multinational sector, which we obtain from the larger covariances. 
Figure 9 shows the welfare effects for individual countries under the two alternative calibrations. The 
countries are ranked according to their capital intensity from left to right. We see that labour intensive 
countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Portugal gain more under a smaller fixed factor. This is because 
they are able to reduce their tax rates, which yields larger gains if these taxes are more distorionary. 
Capital intensive countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland lose more.  
 
The fifth row of Table 7 shows the sensitivity of the results if the response of transfer prices to tax 
differentials is larger due to smaller cost of profit shifting. On average in the EU, the implications are 
limited.  However,  the  impact  for  individual  countries  changes  more  substantially.  For  instance,  the 
welfare effect for low-tax countries becomes smaller. The reason is that transfer pricing only matters 
under separate accounting. Low-tax countries benefit more from transfer price manipulation if the costs 
decline. Therefore, they gain less from the shift towards CFA. The variation of effects of the CFA 
reform therefore becomes smaller. We also see that the effects of CFA are more favourable for labour-
intensive countries and for countries with a small multinational sector (as this sector currently gains 
more from profit shifting).  
 
The last row of Table 7 shows the CFA reform in a version of CORTAX that includes the discriet 
location choice of multinational enterprises. We see that this is important for the economic effects of the   34 
CFA-reform.  In  particular,  the  average  EU  effect  becomes  more  negative.  The  reason  is  that  the 
responsiveness of multinationals to the allocation formula becomes larger if the fixed factor moves 
across  jurisdictions.  Indeed,  by  locating  a  larger  share  of  the  fixed  factor  in  low-tax  countries,  the 
multinational  reduces  its  tax  liability.  CFA  thus  exacerbates  distortions  in  capital  allocation,  which 
causes larger adverse welfare effects in the EU. This negative welfare effect for the EU as a whole 
comes along with a divergence of effects between countries. Indeed, the covariances in Table 7 increase. 
The country variation is also shown in Figure 10, which presents the welfare effect of CFA in both 
versions of CORTAX, i.e. with and without endogenous location choice. Countries in this Figure are 
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Figure 10 Welfare effects of CFA, with endogenous location choice 
 
Figure 10 shows that high-tax countries benefit more from the CFA-reform if location is endogenous. 
The intuition is as follows. In the initial situation with separate accounting, differences in statutory tax 
rates determine location choice. This is unfavourable for high-tax countries. Consolidation implies that 
the effective tax rate, on which firms base their investment decisions, becomes a weighted average of 
the statutory rates (see equation 2). The resulting convergence of effective tax rates implies that the 
disadvantage of high-tax countries is mitigated. This also explains the large difference in effects for 
Belgium. Belgium is a low-tax country in our baseline with a statutory rate of 14%, because it has 
abolished its ACE-system under the CCTB (which is our starting point for the CFA reform). With 
discrete location choice, Belgium has gained substantial inflows of fixed capital due to its low rate. This 
benefit is offset, however, by consolidation. This explains the welfare loss for Belgium and some other 
low-tax countries.    35 
7.2. Consolidation and losses 
The CORTAX assumptions regarding losses imply that the corporate tax burden is relatively high in the 
current  system  of  separate  accounting  with  loss  carry  forward  relative  to  CFA.  Indeed,  losses  can 
immediately  be  offset  under  CFA  against  profits  in  another  country,  which  leads  to  tax  relief.  It 
generates a welfare gain if governments compensate this revenue loss with a reduction in lump-sum 
transfers. The welfare gain is smaller if corporate or labour tax rates are adjusted. The size of these 
effects  depends  on  the  specific  CORTAX  assumptions  regarding  loss  consolidation.  Restrictions  to 
current loss offset might well be less strict, while the possibilities for immediate loss compensation 
under CFA might be more limited than we have assumed. Accordingly, the impact of loss consolidation 
would be smaller than assumed in CORTAX.  
 
To shed light on this, we may consider alternative assumptions regarding loss probabilities and the size 
of losses. Although this keeps the same modelling of the difference between loss carry forward and loss 
consolidation, it modifies the size of the shock accordingly. CORTAX assumes that losses occur on 
average once in every five years (i.e. q=0.8 in equation 3) and that the size of losses and profits are 
equal. If losses would occur less frequently, e.g. once in every ten years, or when the size of losses 
would be halved, this reduces the size of the shock from loss consolidation. Table 8 reveals how this 
modifies the outcomes for the CFA reform. We see that CFA with lump-sum transfers becomes less 
beneficial: the welfare gain drops from 0.08% of GDP to 0.02% or 0.04%. However, the welfare effect 
changes less when corporate or labour taxes are used to balance the budget. Indeed, tax relief by loss 
consolidation yields only small welfare effects under these alternative balanced-budget rules. Reducing 
the size of the shock thus only proportionally modifies the size of the effects.  
 
Table  8:  Welfare  effect  of  consolidation  under  alternative  assumptions  about  losses  and 
alternative budget rules 
  CFA (base case)  Lower loss probability 
Smaller loss to profit 
ratio 
Lump-sum transfers  0.08  0.02  0.04 
Corporate tax rate  0.02  0.00  0.01 
Labour tax rate  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
CORTAX  uses  the  average  probability  and  size  of  losses  in  the  European  Union.  Country-specific 
information can be deduced from the firm-level data, yielding loss probability and loss-to-profit ratio’s 
per country.
12 Country-specific information about losses is summarized in Figure 11.
13 The horizontal 
axis shows the fraction of loss-making firms, about 20% on average in the EU. The vertical axis shows 
the loss-to-profit ratio, defined as the average size of losses per loss-making firm divided by the average 
size of profits in profit-making firms. This ratio is approximately one, on average in the EU. Figure 11 
shows that Denmark, Cyprus and Luxembourg have a high share of loss-making firms (between 35% 
and 40%), but that the average loss per firm is relatively small (about 50% of the profits in profit-
                                                            
12 Note that the calculated values may depend on a very small number of firms, in particular in small countries. Moreover, they may reflect booms or 
busts in an economy and need not hold outside the sample (2003-2007).. 
13 Appendix table A.1 provide more details on the distribution of losses and the rate of return.   36 
making firms). The UK stands out as a country where a high share (30%) of firms is making losses and 
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Figure 11 Loss probability (x-axis) and loss-to-profit ratio (y-axis) in the European Union 
 
Figure  12  shows  the  implications  of  CFA  if  we  adopt  these  country-specific  loss  probabilities  and 
loss/profit ratios in CORTAX. In the Figure, countries are again ranked according to their initial capital-
labour ratio (as in Figure 4). We see that labour-intensive countries  still  gain from  CFA. Country-
specific losses affect welfare for a few countries, in particular the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
Welfare in the UK declines in Figure 12, because CIT-revenues drop and are compensated with a higher 
corporate tax rate. 
This  relatively  large  drop  in  CIT-revenues  when  moving  from  separate  accounting  to  CFA  seems 
counterintuitive. In particular, larger losses made by UK-firms reduce corporate tax revenues in the UK 
to their full extent under separate accounting. Under CFA, the same losses will be apportioned to all 
member states. It would imply that high losses in the UK reduce corporate tax revenue more under 
separate accounting than under consolidation. However, this intuition overlooks the general equilibrium 
implications of higher losses which are captured by CORTAX. In particular, higher losses also cause 
lower expected productivity in a country, which is accompanied by lower wages. In this way, workers 
share in the  incidence of the higher losses. The reduction in  wages offsets the  negative impact on 
corporate tax revenues. This offset is larger under separate accounting because part of the losses under 
CFA  are  shared  with  other  governments.  Effectively,  CFA  implies  that  not  only  larger  losses  are 
apportioned to other member states, but higher profits as a result of lower wages too. On balance, the 
question is who bears the largest share of the higher losses. The answer according to CORTAX is that   37 
the largest share of the revenue loss accrues to the UK-government.
14 Welfare in the UK declines if the 
UK government raises corporate taxes to compensate for this revenue loss. Indeed, the higher UK-tax 
rate causes a relocation of employment, capital and output out of the UK. Countries to which British 
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This paper explores the economic impact of a common consolidated corporate tax base in the EU using 
a numerical CGE model for the EU. We find that neither a common base nor consolidation with formula 
apportionment will yield substantial welfare gains in Europe. Economic benefits may only be achieved 
to the extent that compliance costs fall, which are not captured by our model.  
We find that variation of economic effects across countries is large: some countries gain while others 
lose. This holds both for the introduction of a common base and for the shift from separate accounting to 
consolidation with formula apportionment. The dispersion of effects forms a serious complication in 
achieving  political  agreement  on  corporate  tax  harmonization.  However,  the  distributional  impact 
depends strongly on the choice of the apportionment formula. This leaves some degrees of freedom to 
finding a feasible outcome. Yet, using input factors in the formula to approximate the source principle of 
taxation reduces efficiency as remaining tax differences distort factor allocations across countries. Using 
                                                            
14 In terms of equation (1), 
, UK UK ω  appears to be relatively large (about 0.44).   38 
sales by destination as the sole formula factor is more efficient, but reduces the degrees of freedom to 
steer distributional effects across countries. 
The simulations reveal that consolidation does not reduce the incentives for tax competition in the EU. 
In fact, we find that especially low-tax countries will benefit even more from unilateral tax cuts under 
consolidation as compared to separate accounting. Hence, consolidation may cause a further divergence 
in tax rates across European countries. It offers another argument for rate harmonisation. Indeed, our 
simulations suggest that rate harmonisation, in combination with a common consolidated base, will 
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APPENDIX A: Country specific tables 
The tables in this appendix show the country-specific simulation outcomes. We present the following 
variables: 
 
•  CIT-rate = absolute change in the corporate tax rate imposed on a multinational headquarter 
•  Rev_CIT = absolute change in the corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP 
•  CoC = absolute change in the cost of capital, average across all firms 
•  Wage = relative change in the wage rate 
•  Capital = relative change in total capital stock 
•  Employm. = relative change in total employment 
•  GDP = relative change in gross domestic product 
•  Welfare = (-1) x compensating variation expressed in \% of base GDP (i.e. positive value reflects a 
welfare gain)   41 
Table A.1: Distribution of losses and profits 
  Average return on assets (2003-2007)    Return on assets   
 
10th 













Austria  -2.6%  4.9%  17.8%  17.6%  -7.3%  8.8%  0.48 
Belgium  -2.2%  3.6%  16.4%  22.3%  -4.7%  8.0%  1.20 
Bulgaria  -4.7%  3.8%  20.4%  25.9%  -6.3%  9.8%  0.60 
Cyprus  -10.2%  1.2%  10.7%  35.6%  -8.6%  6.8%  0.57 
Czech Rep.  -2.7%  5.0%  20.7%  18.6%  -6.8%  9.9%  0.53 
Germany  -2.4%  5.6%  20.8%  17.2%  -7.2%  10.0%  0.56 
Denmark  -2.4%  2.1%  15.3%  38.2%  -3.2%  8.7%  0.40 
Spain  -1.9%  3.1%  14.4%  26.5%  -3.7%  7.5%  0.55 
Estonia  -1.6%  7.2%  24.2%  18.0%  -5.7%  12.2%  0.41 
Finland  -2.9%  6.1%  23.4%  20.3%  -6.5%  11.6%  0.40 
France  -3.7%  3.7%  17.3%  27.1%  -5.5%  8.9%  0.72 
United Kingdom  -7.7%  3.8%  16.9%  30.5%  -8.4%  9.1%  1.84 
Greece  -3.2%  4.6%  15.8%  19.3%  -6.5%  8.1%  0.79 
Hungary  -3.5%  5.0%  18.4%  19.3%  -7.2%  9.1%  1.27 
Ireland  -4.1%  4.5%  16.9%  23.6%  -6.8%  8.7%  0.49 
Italy  -1.9%  3.5%  11.7%  17.6%  -6.0%  6.1%  1.50 
Lithuania  -2.7%  5.9%  21.2%  16.5%  -6.9%  10.4%  0.57 
Luxembourg  -3.1%  2.7%  18.1%  35.2%  -4.0%  9.7%  0.45 
Latvia  -3.1%  6.6%  22.4%  16.7%  -8.6%  11.0%  0.57 
Malta  -0.7%  2.3%  21.7%  16.3%  -5.6%  11.9%  1.00 
Netherlands  -3.4%  5.8%  21.3%  22.0%  -6.4%  10.8%  1.13 
Poland  -3.2%  5.9%  22.6%  19.8%  -7.0%  11.0%  0.71 
Portugal  -3.1%  2.9%  12.7%  27.4%  -4.3%  6.7%  0.84 
Romania  -7.4%  5.5%  24.8%  22.8%  -10.1%  11.9%  1.13 
Slovak Rep.  -4.5%  4.0%  18.8%  22.0%  -7.1%  8.9%  0.59 
Slovenia  0.2%  4.3%  13.8%  8.1%  -6.0%  6.7%  1.24 
Sweden  -4.2%  4.5%  19.0%  26.4%  -6.6%  9.9%  0.75 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  on  the  ORBIS  database  42 
Table A.2: Common base with lump-sum financing (compared to Basecase) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.00  -0.42  -0.16  0.81  2.13  0.25  0.81  0.27 
BEL  0.00  2.48  0.97  -4.35  -11.87  -1.56  -4.56  -1.38 
BGR  0.00  -0.07  -0.03  0.16  0.40  0.04  0.15  0.06 
CYP  0.00  -0.11  -0.05  0.18  0.60  0.06  0.19  0.06 
CZE  0.00  -0.46  -0.16  0.99  2.22  0.24  0.93  0.29 
DEU  0.00  -0.15  -0.06  0.27  0.77  0.10  0.29  0.09 
DNK  0.00  0.3  0.13  -0.56  -1.55  -0.14  -0.53  -0.21 
ESP  0.00  -0.57  -0.23  1.10  2.99  0.36  1.12  0.33 
EST  0.00  1.33  0.42  -2.92  -6.08  -0.73  -2.75  -0.83 
FIN  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  0.09  0.23  0.02  0.09  0.03 
FRA  0.00  0.32  0.15  -0.57  -1.76  -0.18  -0.57  -0.20 
GBR  0.00  -0.05  -0.03  0.08  0.33  0.02  0.08  0.03 
GRC  0.00  0.07  0.02  -0.09  -0.24  -0.05  -0.12  -0.01 
HUN  0.00  -0.37  -0.15  0.68  1.87  0.20  0.67  0.22 
IRL  0.00  -0.16  -0.04  0.33  0.74  0.10  0.33  0.09 
ITA  0.00  0.11  0.03  -0.15  -0.45  -0.07  -0.18  -0.03 
LTU  0.00  0.54  0.21  -1.06  -2.71  -0.33  -1.06  -0.33 
LUX  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.19  -0.42  0.00  -0.13  -0.14 
LVA  0.00  0.27  0.10  -0.53  -1.31  -0.17  -0.54  -0.16 
MLT  0.00  -0.34  -0.14  0.61  1.95  0.20  0.62  0.19 
NLD  0.00  -0.22  -0.07  0.42  1.05  0.13  0.42  0.12 
POL  0.00  -0.56  -0.22  1.11  2.85  0.38  1.15  0.36 
PRT  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.12  -0.48  -0.04  -0.12  -0.04 
ROM  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.17  -0.50  -0.05  -0.16  -0.06 
SVK  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.02 
SVN  0.00  -0.24  -0.11  0.44  1.21  0.13  0.44  0.15 
SWE  0.00  0.12  0.05  -0.21  -0.64  -0.06  -0.20  -0.07 
USA  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.00  0  -0.01  0.10  0.22  0.03  0.09  0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.3: CCCTB with lump-sum financing (compared to Common base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  -0.47  -0.3  -0.03  0.37  0.25  0.18  0.04  0.04 
BEL  -4.11  -0.22  -0.13  0.25  0.32  0.09  0.44  0.09 
BGR  0.08  0.05  0.00  0.73  0.48  0.13  -0.52  0.34 
CYP  6.60  -0.14  0.17  0.54  0.00  0.19  -0.43  0.15 
CZE  -0.10  -0.27  -0.04  0.67  0.56  0.24  0.14  0.13 
DEU  -3.39  -0.26  -0.11  0.36  0.51  0.15  0.38  0.10 
DNK  1.65  -0.25  0.05  0.51  0.45  0.16  -0.04  0.16 
ESP  -0.72  -0.43  -0.06  0.55  0.69  0.33  0.46  0.04 
EST  -0.62  0.16  0.00  0.37  0.10  -0.09  -0.32  0.30 
FIN  1.36  -0.38  0.03  0.54  0.55  0.27  0.18  0.07 
FRA  -1.39  -0.41  -0.05  0.36  0.55  0.29  0.41  -0.03 
GBR  0.31  -0.11  -0.01  0.29  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.17 
GRC  -0.64  -0.22  -0.05  0.32  0.34  0.16  0.18  0.04 
HUN  0.33  -0.1  -0.01  0.67  0.22  0.15  -0.33  0.26 
IRL  11.06  -0.55  0.18  0.99  -0.19  0.55  -0.54  0.02 
ITA  -1.77  -0.24  -0.06  0.28  0.35  0.15  0.28  0.04 
LTU  0.04  -0.03  0.01  0.25  0.08  0.07  -0.08  0.09 
LUX  0.64  -5.47  -0.34  6.52  10.08  4.10  5.05  0.63 
LVA  0.20  -0.04  0.00  0.28  0.06  0.08  -0.10  0.09 
MLT  -1.90  -0.35  -0.11  0.64  1.28  0.23  0.61  0.19 
NLD  3.74  -0.84  0.07  0.66  0.65  0.52  0.18  -0.07 
POL  0.08  -0.11  -0.02  0.55  0.43  0.16  -0.04  0.19 
PRT  1.47  0.09  0.03  0.35  -0.33  -0.06  -0.25  0.33 
ROM  0.06  0.1  0.00  0.43  -0.06  0.01  -0.29  0.26 
SVK  0.18  -0.17  -0.02  0.67  1.05  0.23  -0.07  0.17 
SVN  0.11  -0.03  0.01  0.22  0.10  0.04  -0.07  0.09 
SWE  -0.39  -0.24  -0.02  0.42  0.26  0.11  0.05  0.15 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  -0.82  -0.29  -0.05  0.41  0.38  0.17  0.18  0.08 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.4: CCTB with corporate tax financing 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  2.40  -0.17  -0.11  0.47  1.41  0.12  0.44  0.18 
BEL  -20.07  0.66  0.38  -1.23  -5.22  -0.55  0.30  -0.30 
DNK  -1.62  0.09  0.08  -0.30  -0.98  -0.06  -0.26  -0.13 
FIN  0.20  -0.03  -0.01  0.05  0.15  0.01  0.03  0.02 
FRA  -1.70  0.07  0.09  -0.25  -0.98  -0.06  -0.28  -0.11 
DEU  0.77  -0.08  -0.03  0.13  0.47  0.06  0.15  0.03 
GRC  -0.34  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.03  0.01 
IRL  0.69  -0.1  -0.03  0.15  0.50  0.08  0.04  0.01 
ITA  -0.65  0.03  0.02  -0.04  -0.21  -0.03  -0.07  0.00 
LUX  -0.19  -0.17  0.02  -0.05  -0.15  0.14  -0.22  -0.18 
NLD  0.93  -0.19  -0.05  0.22  0.75  0.14  0.14  0.00 
PRT  -0.62  0.04  0.03  -0.06  -0.32  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01 
ESP  2.49  -0.24  -0.14  0.52  1.77  0.18  0.54  0.16 
SWE  -0.68  0.04  0.03  -0.11  -0.40  -0.02  -0.10  -0.05 
GBR  0.38  -0.04  -0.02  0.05  0.25  0.02  0.03  0.01 
CYP  0.70  -0.03  -0.03  0.10  0.38  0.02  0.11  0.04 
CZE  1.84  -0.15  -0.09  0.50  1.28  0.09  0.47  0.17 
EST  -8.39  0.29  0.23  -1.51  -3.27  -0.16  -1.04  -0.64 
HUN  2.03  -0.12  -0.10  0.38  1.19  0.07  0.34  0.16 
LVA  -1.59  0.06  0.06  -0.28  -0.72  -0.05  -0.26  -0.12 
LTU  -3.06  0.12  0.12  -0.52  -1.44  -0.10  -0.49  -0.22 
MLT  1.40  -0.13  -0.07  0.26  1.26  0.11  0.33  0.06 
POL  2.75  -0.18  -0.14  0.59  1.71  0.14  0.59  0.24 
SVK  -0.06  0  -0.01  0.03  0.05  -0.01  0.03  0.03 
SVN  1.42  -0.08  -0.06  0.24  0.73  0.06  0.23  0.10 
BGR  0.41  -0.02  -0.02  0.09  0.25  0.01  0.09  0.05 
ROM  -0.60  0.03  0.03  -0.11  -0.34  -0.02  -0.09  -0.05 
USA  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.08  0.20  0.03  0.10  0.01 
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Table A.5: CCCTB with corporate tax financing (compared to Common base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.24  -0.07  -0.02  0.02  -0.40  0.05  -0.22  -0.04 
BEL  14.41  -0.52  0.41  1.09  -0.09  0.38  -1.21  0.35 
BGR  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.84  0.57  0.15  -0.58  0.39 
CYP  7.27  -0.03  0.18  0.42  -0.31  0.14  -0.55  0.13 
CZE  0.85  -0.14  0.00  0.43  0.13  0.17  -0.04  0.07 
DEU  -2.48  -0.10  -0.10  0.14  0.03  0.06  0.18  0.04 
DNK  2.79  -0.14  0.09  0.43  0.21  0.13  -0.19  0.14 
ESP  0.08  -0.12  -0.03  0.01  -0.27  0.15  0.08  -0.15 
EST  -0.94  -0.08  -0.01  1.22  0.81  0.16  -0.45  0.49 
FIN  2.09  -0.11  0.06  0.13  -0.18  0.15  -0.10  -0.06 
FRA  -0.68  -0.08  -0.03  -0.11  -0.52  0.13  0.01  -0.17 
GBR  1.48  -0.06  0.00  0.26  -0.13  -0.01  -0.06  0.19 
GRC  0.17  -0.07  -0.01  0.11  -0.09  0.09  -0.04  -0.01 
HUN  1.04  -0.03  0.01  0.58  0.02  0.12  -0.37  0.24 
IRL  10.50  -0.02  0.18  0.05  -1.55  0.22  -1.16  -0.20 
ITA  -0.57  -0.12  -0.03  0.12  -0.05  0.09  0.11  0.00 
LTU  0.17  -0.01  0.00  0.26  0.03  0.07  -0.15  0.09 
LUX  2.27  -4.52  -0.23  3.96  7.50  3.90  3.94  -0.98 
LVA  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.27  -0.02  0.07  -0.17  0.10 
MLT  -1.50  -0.31  -0.08  0.56  1.23  0.23  0.57  0.12 
NLD  4.31  -0.07  0.09  -0.67  -1.49  0.10  -0.81  -0.47 
POL  0.69  -0.04  -0.01  0.45  0.22  0.12  -0.09  0.17 
PRT  1.96  -0.04  0.04  0.66  -0.12  -0.01  -0.19  0.45 
ROM  -0.33  0.07  -0.01  0.56  0.01  0.04  -0.30  0.31 
SVK  0.65  -0.12  0.01  0.65  0.99  0.22  -0.17  0.17 
SVN  0.10  -0.03  0.01  0.24  0.12  0.04  -0.05  0.10 
SWE  0.73  -0.13  0.01  0.30  -0.09  0.06  -0.10  0.13 
USA  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.35  -0.11  -0.02  0.20  -0.13  0.09  -0.06  0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.6: CCTB with labour tax financing 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.00  -0.43  -0.16  0.82  1.97  0.09  0.65  0.19 
BEL  0.00  2.52  0.97  -4.39  -10.89  -0.44  -3.51  -0.82 
DNK  0.00  0.3  0.13  -0.56  -1.48  -0.06  -0.45  -0.16 
FIN  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  0.09  0.23  0.02  0.08  0.03 
FRA  0.00  0.33  0.15  -0.57  -1.65  -0.06  -0.46  -0.13 
DEU  0.00  -0.16  -0.06  0.28  0.69  0.02  0.21  0.05 
GRC  0.00  0.07  0.02  -0.10  -0.17  0.01  -0.05  0.02 
IRL  0.00  -0.16  -0.04  0.33  0.65  0.01  0.24  0.05 
ITA  0.00  0.11  0.03  -0.15  -0.37  0.01  -0.10  0.01 
LUX  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.19  -0.37  0.06  -0.08  -0.12 
NLD  0.00  -0.22  -0.07  0.42  0.93  0.02  0.31  0.07 
PRT  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.13  -0.45  0.00  -0.09  -0.02 
ESP  0.00  -0.59  -0.23  1.11  2.68  0.05  0.82  0.19 
SWE  0.00  0.12  0.05  -0.21  -0.62  -0.03  -0.18  -0.06 
GBR  0.00  -0.05  -0.03  0.08  0.30  0.00  0.06  0.02 
CYP  0.00  -0.11  -0.05  0.18  0.54  0.00  0.13  0.03 
CZE  0.00  -0.46  -0.16  1.00  2.07  0.09  0.78  0.21 
EST  0.00  1.35  0.42  -2.95  -5.53  -0.14  -2.18  -0.56 
HUN  0.00  -0.37  -0.15  0.68  1.74  0.06  0.54  0.15 
LVA  0.00  0.27  0.10  -0.53  -1.18  -0.04  -0.41  -0.10 
LTU  0.00  0.55  0.21  -1.07  -2.46  -0.07  -0.81  -0.21 
MLT  0.00  -0.35  -0.14  0.62  1.77  0.02  0.45  0.10 
POL  0.00  -0.57  -0.22  1.12  2.56  0.09  0.87  0.23 
SVK  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03 
SVN  0.00  -0.24  -0.11  0.44  1.12  0.04  0.35  0.10 
BGR  0.00  -0.07  -0.03  0.16  0.37  0.02  0.13  0.05 
ROM  0.00  0.08  0.04  -0.17  -0.46  -0.01  -0.13  -0.05 
USA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.10  0.19  0.00  0.07  0.01   47 
Table A.7: CCCTB with labour tax financing (compared to Common base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  -0.48  -0.30  -0.03  0.38  0.01  -0.06  -0.19  -0.08 
BEL  -4.10  -0.23  -0.13  0.26  0.07  -0.19  0.18  -0.07 
BGR  0.08  0.06  0.00  0.71  1.12  0.77  0.09  0.65 
CYP  6.60  -0.14  0.17  0.54  0.05  0.24  -0.38  0.17 
CZE  -0.10  -0.28  -0.04  0.66  0.55  0.22  0.13  0.12 
DEU  -3.40  -0.26  -0.11  0.37  0.29  -0.08  0.16  -0.01 
DNK  1.64  -0.24  0.05  0.51  0.48  0.18  -0.03  0.17 
ESP  -0.72  -0.44  -0.06  0.57  0.37  0.01  0.15  -0.11 
EST  -0.62  0.17  0.00  0.36  0.44  0.29  0.03  0.46 
FIN  1.36  -0.38  0.03  0.54  0.32  0.04  -0.03  -0.06 
FRA  -1.39  -0.44  -0.05  0.37  0.09  -0.19  -0.05  -0.30 
GBR  0.32  -0.11  -0.01  0.29  -0.02  0.00  -0.03  0.16 
GRC  -0.64  -0.22  -0.05  0.33  0.16  -0.01  0.00  -0.04 
HUN  0.33  -0.10  -0.01  0.66  0.66  0.60  0.10  0.51 
IRL  11.08  -0.56  0.19  1.01  -0.44  0.29  -0.78  -0.10 
ITA  -1.77  -0.25  -0.06  0.29  0.12  -0.09  0.05  -0.07 
LTU  0.04  -0.03  0.01  0.24  0.17  0.16  0.01  0.13 
LUX  0.64  -5.70  -0.34  6.84  2.42  -3.39  -2.23  -2.66 
LVA  0.20  -0.03  0.00  0.27  0.19  0.21  0.02  0.15 
MLT  -1.90  -0.35  -0.11  0.64  1.12  0.06  0.45  0.11 
NLD  3.75  -0.87  0.07  0.70  -0.25  -0.40  -0.71  -0.52 
POL  0.08  -0.1  -0.02  0.54  0.67  0.40  0.20  0.30 
PRT  1.46  0.09  0.03  0.36  -0.13  0.13  -0.05  0.43 
ROM  0.06  0.11  0.00  0.42  0.22  0.30  0.00  0.40 
SVK  0.18  -0.16  -0.02  0.66  1.19  0.37  0.06  0.23 
SVN  0.11  -0.03  0.01  0.21  0.23  0.17  0.06  0.17 
SWE  -0.40  -0.24  -0.02  0.42  0.21  0.06  0.01  0.13 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  -0.82  -0.30  -0.05  0.42  0.23  0.02  0.03  -0.03 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.8: Direct effect on CIT revenues of CCCTB with alternative apportionment formulas  
(compared to Common base) 
  employment  payroll  capital  production  equal shares 
AUT  -0.33  -0.23  -0.16  -0.22  -0.24 
BEL  -0.15  0.35  0.70  0.36  0.30 
BGR  0.13  -0.06  -0.05  -0.06  0.01 
CYP  -0.12  -0.06  -0.15  -0.09  -0.12 
CZE  -0.02  -0.34  -0.20  -0.26  -0.16 
DEU  -0.21  -0.17  -0.06  -0.16  -0.14 
DNK  -0.13  -0.10  -0.07  -0.09  -0.10 
ESP  -0.27  -0.44  -0.31  -0.37  -0.32 
EST  0.59  -0.05  0.27  0.01  0.29 
FIN  -0.28  -0.31  -0.22  -0.27  -0.25 
FRA  -0.31  -0.18  -0.33  -0.21  -0.28 
GBR  0.06  0.16  -0.22  0.03  -0.04 
GRC  -0.16  -0.16  -0.11  -0.14  -0.13 
HUN  0.04  -0.16  -0.16  -0.15  -0.09 
IRL  -0.74  -0.69  -0.29  -0.56  -0.53 
ITA  -0.09  -0.13  -0.09  -0.13  -0.11 
LTU  0.06  -0.07  -0.05  -0.06  -0.02 
LUX  -5.67  -4.60  -4.06  -3.38  -4.37 
LVA  0.02  -0.07  -0.05  -0.06  -0.03 
MLT  0.09  -0.19  -0.19  -0.17  -0.09 
NLD  -0.98  -0.89  -0.51  -0.77  -0.75 
POL  0.03  -0.17  -0.13  -0.14  -0.08 
PRT  0.52  0.17  -0.14  0.07  0.15 
ROM  0.21  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03  0.04 
SVK  0.02  -0.19  -0.06  -0.14  -0.06 
SVN  0.08  -0.03  -0.05  -0.02  0.00 
SWE  -0.13  -0.05  -0.12  -0.09  -0.11 
  Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.9: CCCTB with employment formula and corporate tax financing (compared to Common 
base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  -1.57  -0.12  -0.06  -0.17  -0.37  0.09  -0.20  -0.19 
BEL  14.44  -0.51  0.41  0.25  -2.66  0.43  -1.92  -0.18 
DNK  2.36  -0.17  0.07  0.32  -0.28  0.15  -0.30  0.05 
FIN  1.00  -0.17  0.01  0.05  -0.11  0.17  -0.06  -0.13 
FRA  -1.12  -0.14  -0.04  -0.16  -0.09  0.19  0.15  -0.25 
DEU  -4.03  -0.19  -0.14  0.03  0.67  0.14  0.43  -0.10 
GRC  -0.67  -0.12  -0.04  0.05  0.01  0.11  0.02  -0.07 
IRL  11.69  -0.06  0.20  -0.93  -3.12  0.29  -1.86  -0.83 
ITA  -2.11  -0.19  -0.07  0.11  0.40  0.12  0.27  -0.04 
LUX  -0.16  -6.85  -0.38  5.12  11.19  5.27  6.08  -1.54 
NLD  3.14  -0.22  0.06  -1.17  -1.35  0.23  -0.75  -0.88 
PRT  -0.92  0.11  -0.02  1.31  -0.93  -0.15  -0.49  1.08 
ESP  -1.06  -0.20  -0.07  0.07  0.57  0.20  0.36  -0.15 
SWE  -0.27  -0.19  -0.01  0.23  -0.11  0.08  -0.08  0.07 
GBR  0.75  -0.09  -0.01  0.37  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.28 
CYP  6.63  -0.03  0.17  0.43  -1.42  0.12  -0.85  0.16 
CZE  -0.15  -0.13  -0.04  0.71  0.23  0.12  -0.05  0.26 
EST  -1.95  0.13  -0.03  2.45  -1.36  0.03  -1.91  1.28 
HUN  -0.10  0.07  -0.02  1.03  -0.80  0.03  -0.78  0.60 
LVA  0.02  0.09  -0.01  0.56  -0.63  0.03  -0.55  0.29 
LTU  -0.33  0.09  -0.01  0.57  -0.42  0.03  -0.50  0.32 
MLT  -4.23  -0.41  -0.22  0.77  2.46  0.22  0.93  0.28 
POL  -0.21  0.04  -0.03  0.76  0.02  0.03  -0.28  0.42 
SVK  0.13  -0.09  -0.01  0.90  0.39  0.19  -0.52  0.33 
SVN  -0.64  -0.03  -0.02  0.36  0.13  0.02  -0.07  0.21 
BGR  -0.76  0.83  -0.03  3.16  -3.44  -0.28  -4.58  2.23 
ROM  -1.80  0.72  -0.04  1.80  -2.36  -0.36  -2.16  1.45 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  -0.74  -0.15  -0.05  0.30  -0.11  0.09  -0.15  0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.10: CCCTB with payroll formula and corporate tax financing (compared to Common 
base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  1.54  0.06  0.00  -0.14  -0.78  -0.01  -0.38  -0.08 
BEL  15.16  -0.26  0.43  0.97  -3.54  0.16  -2.47  0.43 
DNK  3.31  -0.09  0.10  0.41  -0.51  0.11  -0.41  0.15 
FIN  2.83  -0.14  0.08  0.11  -0.41  0.19  -0.14  -0.12 
FRA  -0.06  0.08  0.00  -0.16  -0.48  0.01  -0.07  -0.11 
DEU  -1.79  -0.05  -0.08  0.03  0.30  0.05  0.25  -0.02 
GRC  0.33  -0.07  -0.01  0.06  -0.17  0.08  -0.06  -0.04 
IRL  12.05  0.04  0.21  -0.78  -3.57  0.23  -2.02  -0.69 
ITA  -0.30  -0.15  -0.03  0.15  0.17  0.11  0.19  0.00 
LUX  2.70  -4.83  -0.21  4.05  9.99  4.23  4.93  -1.25 
NLD  4.96  0.01  0.11  -1.20  -1.71  0.15  -0.92  -0.83 
PRT  -0.57  -0.25  -0.01  1.10  -0.62  0.07  -0.22  0.64 
ESP  -0.69  -0.34  -0.06  0.12  0.56  0.32  0.44  -0.24 
SWE  1.38  -0.03  0.03  0.31  -0.49  -0.01  -0.25  0.20 
GBR  1.16  0.08  0.00  0.45  -0.32  -0.13  -0.15  0.47 
CYP  6.80  0.07  0.17  0.58  -1.74  0.07  -0.97  0.32 
CZE  -0.03  -0.50  -0.04  0.57  0.38  0.41  0.23  -0.09 
EST  -2.10  -0.48  -0.04  0.75  -0.15  0.34  -0.37  0.05 
HUN  -0.01  -0.27  -0.02  0.62  -0.42  0.26  -0.36  0.14 
LVA  0.04  -0.10  -0.01  0.21  -0.18  0.11  -0.14  0.03 
LTU  -0.32  -0.13  -0.01  0.23  -0.07  0.12  -0.09  0.03 
MLT  -1.95  -0.57  -0.11  0.91  2.33  0.39  0.96  0.18 
POL  -0.20  -0.30  -0.03  0.50  0.25  0.29  0.08  0.07 
SVK  0.13  -0.33  -0.01  0.52  0.30  0.35  -0.12  -0.01 
SVN  -0.56  -0.14  -0.01  0.34  0.18  0.11  0.01  0.10 
BGR  -0.80  -0.20  -0.03  0.46  0.02  0.21  -0.22  0.10 
ROM  -1.78  -0.22  -0.04  0.50  0.02  0.19  -0.08  0.14 
USA  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.31  -0.10  -0.02  0.19  -0.15  0.11  -0.04  0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations   51 
Table A.11: CCCTB with capital formula and corporate tax financing (compared to Common 
base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.76  -0.05  -0.01  0.16  -0.18  0.03  -0.16  0.06 
BEL  12.98  -0.48  0.36  1.80  5.02  0.25  0.06  0.86 
DNK  2.48  -0.12  0.07  0.47  1.05  0.11  0.01  0.18 
FIN  1.94  -0.10  0.05  0.21  0.03  0.13  -0.05  0.00 
FRA  -1.17  -0.10  -0.05  -0.19  -1.08  0.17  -0.11  -0.25 
DEU  -2.37  -0.10  -0.10  0.27  -0.35  0.04  0.06  0.14 
GRC  0.41  -0.06  -0.01  0.17  -0.01  0.08  -0.02  0.03 
IRL  8.75  0.14  0.14  1.28  2.15  0.06  0.20  0.70 
ITA  -0.44  -0.12  -0.03  0.14  -0.30  0.09  0.03  0.01 
LUX  1.23  -4.10  -0.29  3.70  4.65  3.41  2.74  -0.67 
NLD  3.83  -0.01  0.08  -0.13  -0.80  -0.05  -0.63  -0.03 
PRT  4.15  -0.09  0.09  0.14  -0.02  0.08  -0.14  -0.01 
ESP  0.23  -0.12  -0.02  0.03  -0.91  0.16  -0.10  -0.14 
SWE  0.73  -0.13  0.01  0.28  0.12  0.06  -0.05  0.12 
GBR  1.93  -0.09  0.01  0.00  -0.63  0.05  -0.19  -0.06 
CYP  7.55  -0.03  0.19  0.26  1.13  0.14  -0.21  0.03 
CZE  1.16  -0.13  0.01  0.34  0.33  0.18  0.03  0.01 
EST  -0.91  -0.07  -0.01  1.12  3.12  0.15  0.41  0.44 
HUN  1.70  -0.04  0.03  0.31  0.80  0.14  -0.11  0.06 
LVA  0.57  0.00  0.01  0.18  0.44  0.06  0.01  0.05 
LTU  0.40  -0.02  0.01  0.13  0.34  0.06  -0.02  0.03 
MLT  -0.55  -0.34  -0.03  0.43  -0.05  0.30  0.27  -0.04 
POL  1.13  -0.06  0.01  0.28  0.47  0.14  0.03  0.06 
SVK  0.66  -0.09  0.01  0.63  2.07  0.21  0.18  0.17 
SVN  0.60  -0.04  0.02  0.14  0.16  0.06  -0.02  0.02 
BGR  0.48  -0.02  0.01  0.30  1.28  0.11  0.03  0.08 
ROM  0.63  -0.02  0.01  0.16  0.44  0.07  -0.03  0.04 
USA  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.50  -0.11  -0.01  0.17  -0.13  0.09  -0.05  0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.12: CCCTB with production formula and corporate tax financing (compared to Common 
base) 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  1.12  -0.06  -0.01  0.07  -0.45  0.05  -0.23  -0.01 
BEL  14.94  -0.51  0.43  1.24  -1.25  0.37  -1.57  0.44 
DNK  3.03  -0.13  0.09  0.46  0.00  0.13  -0.25  0.15 
FIN  2.71  -0.10  0.08  0.12  -0.31  0.16  -0.13  -0.08 
FRA  -0.91  -0.07  -0.04  0.02  -0.27  0.10  0.05  -0.06 
DEU  -2.20  -0.09  -0.09  0.12  0.13  0.06  0.20  0.03 
GRC  0.41  -0.07  -0.01  0.10  -0.15  0.08  -0.06  -0.01 
IRL  10.72  -0.02  0.18  -0.08  -2.28  0.24  -1.42  -0.29 
ITA  -0.15  -0.11  -0.02  0.09  -0.07  0.09  0.10  -0.02 
LUX  2.95  -2.88  -0.19  3.22  6.65  2.65  2.75  -0.25 
NLD  4.60  -0.06  0.10  -0.70  -1.48  0.12  -0.80  -0.51 
PRT  2.74  -0.05  0.06  0.53  -0.50  0.01  -0.26  0.33 
ESP  0.22  -0.12  -0.02  -0.08  -0.26  0.17  0.09  -0.22 
SWE  1.24  -0.11  0.03  0.35  -0.20  0.05  -0.12  0.17 
GBR  1.27  -0.03  0.00  0.38  -0.10  -0.05  -0.04  0.31 
CYP  7.39  -0.02  0.19  0.55  -0.72  0.14  -0.65  0.22 
CZE  1.58  -0.17  0.02  0.19  -0.21  0.23  -0.12  -0.11 
EST  0.29  -0.13  0.01  0.37  -0.11  0.15  -0.49  0.04 
HUN  1.61  -0.06  0.02  0.36  -0.34  0.14  -0.41  0.09 
LVA  0.68  -0.01  0.01  0.12  -0.19  0.06  -0.18  0.02 
LTU  0.45  -0.02  0.01  0.11  -0.18  0.06  -0.16  0.01 
MLT  -0.48  -0.31  -0.03  0.47  1.28  0.27  0.57  0.02 
POL  1.19  -0.08  0.01  0.27  -0.05  0.15  -0.12  0.04 
SVK  1.16  -0.13  0.02  0.37  0.41  0.23  -0.23  0.01 
SVN  0.38  -0.04  0.01  0.19  0.01  0.05  -0.07  0.06 
BGR  0.51  -0.03  0.01  0.26  0.05  0.11  -0.29  0.06 
ROM  0.40  -0.02  0.00  0.23  -0.12  0.07  -0.19  0.08 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00 
JPN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.60  -0.10  -0.01  0.16  -0.19  0.09  -0.06  0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A.13: CCCTB with a common corporate tax rate at 32.5% (compared to Common Base); 
government budget closed with lump-sum transfers 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.00  -0.37  -0.03  0.38  0.48  0.21  0.31  0.09 
BEL  0.00  -0.4  0.02  0.44  0.58  0.19  0.35  0.19 
BGR  0.00  -0.29  -0.01  0.82  0.65  0.17  0.30  0.24 
CYP  0.00  -0.48  -0.02  0.98  0.73  0.33  0.46  0.13 
CZE  0.00  -0.45  0.00  0.51  0.48  0.33  0.42  0.02 
DEU  0.00  -0.31  -0.03  0.35  0.47  0.21  0.30  0.12 
DNK  0.00  -0.31  -0.04  0.41  0.47  0.25  0.26  0.05 
ESP  0.00  -1.06  -0.07  1.36  1.40  0.87  1.28  -0.01 
EST  0.00  -0.21  -0.01  0.16  0.32  0.14  0.19  0.06 
FIN  0.00  -4.72  -0.29  9.48  5.55  3.57  4.88  0.47 
FRA  0.00  -0.76  -0.04  0.88  0.87  0.24  0.42  0.29 
GBR  0.00  0.14  0.00  -0.16  0.35  -0.12  -0.02  0.39 
GRC  0.00  -0.45  -0.03  0.70  0.67  0.36  0.48  0.07 
HUN  0.00  -0.28  -0.02  0.40  0.60  0.09  0.24  0.27 
IRL  0.00  -0.08  -0.02  -0.03  0.39  -0.02  0.07  0.28 
ITA  0.00  -0.32  -0.02  0.55  0.59  0.17  0.27  0.21 
LTU  0.00  -0.41  -0.04  0.98  0.87  0.32  0.48  0.15 
LUX  0.00  0.25  0.02  0.00  0.29  -0.21  -0.14  0.36 
LVA  0.00  -0.24  -0.04  0.64  0.70  0.17  0.30  0.25 
MLT  0.00  -0.1  0.00  0.16  0.32  0.09  0.12  0.11 
NLD  0.00  -0.07  0.01  0.13  0.29  0.07  0.08  0.12 
POL  0.00  -0.47  0.00  1.87  0.94  0.37  0.50  0.24 
PRT  0.00  -0.23  -0.05  0.66  0.65  0.21  0.30  0.23 
ROM  0.00  -0.26  -0.03  1.16  0.76  0.27  0.37  0.20 
SVK  0.00  -0.04  0.01  0.14  0.25  0.04  0.07  0.12 
SVN  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.46  0.51  0.02  0.06  0.31 
SWE  0.00  0.06  -0.01  0.03  0.29  -0.05  -0.01  0.23 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
JPN  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
EU  0.00  -0.32  -0.02  0.41  0.51  0.19  0.28  0.14 
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Table A.14: CCCTB with a common corporate tax rate at 32.5% (compared to Common Base); 
government budget closed with labour tax rates 
  CIT_rate   Rev_CIT   CoC   Wage   Capital   Employm.   GDP   Welfare 
  (a)  (y)  (a)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (r)  (y) 
AUT  0.00  -0.38  -0.03  0.07  0.49  -0.12  -0.01  -0.08 
BEL  0.00  -0.41  0.02  0.15  0.59  -0.14  0.04  0.02 
BGR  0.00  -0.29  -0.01  0.85  0.65  0.19  0.32  0.25 
CYP  0.00  -0.5  -0.02  0.71  0.74  0.05  0.19  -0.04 
CZE  0.00  -0.46  0.00  0.12  0.50  -0.06  0.04  -0.20 
DEU  0.00  -0.32  -0.03  0.15  0.48  0.02  0.11  0.02 
DNK  0.00  -0.32  -0.04  0.18  0.48  0.00  0.03  -0.05 
ESP  0.00  -1.13  -0.07  0.52  1.43  -0.06  0.42  -0.43 
EST  0.00  -0.22  -0.01  0.04  0.33  0.02  0.07  0.00 
FIN  0.00  -5.04  -0.29  0.96  5.95  -4.89  -3.28  -2.84 
FRA  0.00  -0.79  -0.04  0.14  0.90  -0.53  -0.32  -0.08 
GBR  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.07  0.34  0.11  0.21  0.52 
GRC  0.00  -0.46  -0.03  0.40  0.67  0.06  0.20  -0.06 
HUN  0.00  -0.28  -0.02  0.43  0.59  0.13  0.27  0.29 
IRL  0.00  -0.08  -0.02  0.00  0.38  0.01  0.10  0.30 
ITA  0.00  -0.34  -0.02  0.40  0.59  0.01  0.12  0.14 
LTU  0.00  -0.43  -0.04  0.86  0.88  0.20  0.37  0.09 
LUX  0.00  0.27  0.02  0.38  0.27  0.23  0.26  0.56 
LVA  0.00  -0.23  -0.04  0.78  0.69  0.32  0.44  0.34 
MLT  0.00  -0.11  0.00  0.18  0.31  0.11  0.13  0.12 
NLD  0.00  -0.07  0.01  0.17  0.29  0.11  0.11  0.13 
POL  0.00  -0.48  0.00  1.70  0.95  0.20  0.34  0.14 
PRT  0.00  -0.23  -0.05  0.70  0.65  0.24  0.33  0.23 
ROM  0.00  -0.27  -0.03  1.14  0.76  0.23  0.34  0.19 
SVK  0.00  -0.04  0.01  0.28  0.25  0.16  0.19  0.19 
SVN  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.73  0.50  0.30  0.33  0.45 
SWE  0.00  0.07  -0.01  0.20  0.28  0.12  0.16  0.31 
USA  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01 
JPN  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
EU  0.00  -0.33  -0.02  0.25  0.52  0.03  0.13  0.04 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Appendix B  Modelling firm behaviour in CORTAX 
This appendix discusses in more detail how firm behaviour is modelled. CORTAX starts from a 
standard dynamic optimization problem of the firm, which maximizes its value subject to 
accumulation constraints and a production function. In optimizing its value, firms choose their 
optimal levels of employment and investment, as well as the optimal financial structure between 
debt and equity. We also discuss the two extensions of the basic framework: the introduction of 
losses and the modelling of location choices.  
Model of the firm 
Denote the value of the firm in year t by Vt and its dividend payments by Divt. We ignore new 
equity issues and abstract from residence taxes on capital levied at the household level. An 
investor is indifferent between investing in the firm and investing elsewhere at a rate of return r 
as long as: 
t t t t V V Div rV − + = +1   (B.1) 
The right-hand side of (B.1) reflects the sum of dividends and capital gains on the investment in 
the firm. The left-hand side shows the return on the asset Vt if it were invested elsewhere. The 
rate r denotes the discount rate used by the firm. Solving (B.1) for Vt yields an expression for 














Div V   (B.2) 
Dividends follow from the cash-flow restriction of the firm: 
t bt t bt t t t bt b b t t t K d K d I K d c r wL Y Div − + − Π − + − − = + + 1 1 ] [ τ   (B.3) 
where Yt  denotes output (price is normalised to 1) and wLt stands for labour costs. The third 
term on the right-hand side of (B.3) captures the cost of debt. It equals the debt ratio (db) times 
the capital stock (Kt) times the real interest on firm debt rb. In addition to this, the variable cb 
denotes a financial distress or agency cost associated with high debt finance. It depends on the 
leverage of the firm, i.e. cb = cb (dbt). The fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of (B.3) 
reflect corporate tax payments (τΠt ) and investment (It). Finally, cash-flow is affected by a 
change in debt of the firm, captured by the last two terms on the right-hand side of (B.3). 
 
The corporate tax base, Πt , is defined as:   56 
t t f t b bt t t t I D K R d wL Y φ δ − − − − = Π   (B.4) 
It consist of total revenue from sales minus labour costs, deductible financial costs and 
deductible depreciation allowances. The third term on the right-hand side of (B.4) reflects the 
deductible financial costs from investment. As shown by (B.4), it is the nominal interest 
payments on actual debt (dbtRbKt) which are deductible from the corporate tax base, where Rb = 
(1+rb)(1+π)-1 ≈ rb + π is the nominal interest rate and π is the rate of inflation. Most corporate 
tax systems do not allow a deduction of the cost of equity, except for Belgium that introduced 
such a system in 2006. The last two terms on the right-hand side of (B.4) reflect fiscal 
depreciation. The fourth term is the annual rate of fiscal depreciation, equal to δf , times the 
stock of fiscal depreciable assets, denoted by Dt. The last term denotes the share of the 
investment that can be depreciated immediately after its purchase, measured by φ . Note 
thatφ = 1 would imply immediate expensing of investment. If φ = δf, annual fiscal depreciation 
at rate δf  would start in the period of purchase, rather than one year after the purchase.  
 
Regarding economic and fiscal depreciation, we assume a declining balance at a rates of, 
respectively, δ and δf . The accumulation of capital in, respectively, the firms financial accounts 
and its tax accounts is thus reflected by: 
t t t K I K ) 1 ( 1 δ − + = +   (B.5) 
 
t f t t D I D ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 δ φ π − + − = + +   (B.6) 
where (B.6) takes into account that fiscal depreciation only applies to the share that is not 
immediately expensed, i.e. (1-φ ) and that the price of fiscal assets is not indexed for inflation.  
 
Firm behaviour is now derived from maximizing its value (B.2), subject to the accumulation 
equations (B.5) and (B.6): 
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K I K D I D Div L δ µ δ φ π λ (B.7) 
where λt is the Langrange multiplier for Dt and  t the Langrange multiplier for Kt (Tobins q) and 
discounting occurs at the real rate r. We will now subsequently discuss the optimal choice 
regarding the financial structure and investment by the firm. 
Financial behaviour 
We first optimize (B.7) with respect to the debt share. This yields the following first-order 
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+   (B.8) 
The left-hand side of (B.8) denotes the marginal cost of a higher debt share. High debt may be 
costly due to financial distress associated with a larger risk of bankruptcy or higher agency 
costs. In the optimum, the marginal cost of higher debt equal the marginal benefit reflected by 
the right-hand side of (B.8). This marginal benefit of debt finance is equal to the difference in 
the real required market cost of debt versus equity plus a tax term that reflects the favourable 
treatment of debt over equity. Hence, due to this discrimination of the corporate tax system in 
favour of debt, the corporate tax rate raises the relative benefits of debt finance. 
 
The benefits from debt finance on the right-hand side of (B.8) are independent of the debt share. 
To avoid a corner solution in which firms find it optimal to finance the entire capital stock with 
either debt or equity, we specify a convex cost function of holding debt. In particular, we use 
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  (B.10) 
As long as the debt share exceeds εb, expression (B.10) suggests that the marginal cost of 
holding debt is positive. The marginal costs tend to rise in the debt share and fall in the 
parameters χ and εb. Hence, the higher the initial leverage of the firm, the more costly it is to 
further raise the share of debt finance. The parameters χ and εb are set at levels so as to replicate 
the elasticity of the debt share found in empirical studies.  
Investment behaviour 
To find optimal investment, we specify the production function Yt = CES (Kt , Lt ) as a constant 
elasticity of substitution function with capital and labour as inputs. Production features 
decreasing returns to scale with respect to these to inputs. Thus, a fixed factor is at the 
background, which earns an economic rent in production. In optimizing its value, the firm 
determines the optimal demand for labour and investment. Labour demand is determined by 
setting the value of the marginal product of labour equal to the before-tax wage rate. Below, we 
concentrate on the demand for investment. Denote the marginal product of capital as YK . The 
first-order conditions for investment It, and the stock variables Dt and Kt  read as follows:   58 
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b b b b b K R d c r r d r Y τ δ µ τ − − − − + = − ) ( ) ( ) 1 (   (B.13) 
where we used the property that λ and   are constant on a steady state balanced growth path. 
The first-order conditions in (B.11) – (B.13) together determine the optimal investment by 
firms. In particular, by substituting (B.11) and (B.12) into (B.13), we get the following 
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[ ] r d R d c r d r b b b b b b ) 1 ( * − + − + = τ   (B.15) 
Expression (B.14) denotes the cost of capital, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital that is 
required to make up for the cost of finance and depreciation. In the absence of a corporate 
income tax, the cost of capital is equal to the financial cost of investment (i.e. the weighted 
average of debt and equity) and economic depreciation. To understand the impact of corporate 
taxation, we first consider the case of equity-financed investment (i.e. if the marginal debt share 



























K   (B.16) 
We see that the cost of capital is equal to that in the absence of tax (r + δ), plus a tax term 
between square brackets. The tax term is zero if φ = 1. In that case, there is immediate 
expensing of investment, which transforms the corporate income tax into an R-based cash-flow 
tax. This system is neutral to the cost of capital and, therefore, for investment. Also if the 
normal return on equity-financed investment would be deductible from the corporate tax, the 
corporate tax would be neutral to the cost of capital and investment. This neutrality property of 




1 We assume no adjustment costs in capital formation so the capital stock will immediately move to its new optimum.   59 
Ifφ < 1, the term between square brackets on the right-hand side of (B.16) is always positive. 
Hence, corporate taxes raise the cost of capital financed by equity. A higher cost of capital 
requires that the marginal product of capital increases. In light of decreasing returns to scale 
with respect to capital in production, a smaller capital stock is required to achieve this. 
Consequently, a higher cost of capital induced by a higher corporate tax rate will reduce 
investment.  
 
If part of investment is financed by debt (db > 0), (B.15) is modified as the financial cost of 
investment is now a weighted average of the cost of debt and the cost of equity. We see that the 
cost of debt is reduced by the deductibility of nominal interest costs. The interest deductibility 
thus reduces the cost of capital, perhaps even below the level obtained in the absence of tax.  
Profit shifting behaviour 
In producing output, subsidiaries use intermediate inputs that are supplied by their parent 
company. The arms-length price for this intermediate input is equal to the market price of the 
numeraire good, but the parent company can manipulate this transfer price for intra-company 
deliveries. In particular, the benefit from marginally changing the transfer price is measured by 
the difference in the statutory corporate tax rate that applies to the subsidiary (τ
f) and the rate 
that applies to the parent (τ
m). This benefit needs to be weighed against the cost of transfer 
pricing. We adopt the following cost function for manipulating transfer pricing (i.e. the price 















  (B.17) 
Hence, deviating the transfer price (pq) from its arms-length price (equal to one) creates a cost 
for the multinational, which is convex if εq > 0. In the optimum, the marginal cost from transfer 
price manipulation is set equal to marginal benefit, which is determined by the corporate tax 
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Expression (B.18) shows that the headquarter company has an incentive to set an artificially 
low (high) transfer price for supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) 
statutory corporate tax rate. In this way, it shifts profits from high to low-tax countries, thereby 
reducing its overall tax payment. The marginal cost of this manipulation depends on the initial 
deviation of the transfer price from its arms-length price. The speed at which transfer prices   60 
increase is determined by the parameter εq. In the model, we set its value so as to replicate 
empirical evidence on profit shifting.  
Incentive effects of loss consolidation versus loss carry forward 
Assume a firm that produces output by combining labour and capital. Ex-ante, firms are equal. 
Ex-post, they may suffer from a random shock in the value of sales. In the good outcome, the 
revenue from sales equals Yt
g. In the bad outcome, there is a lower value Yt
b, such that profits 
are negative. Ex-post, a share of q firms obtain a good outcome and a share 1-q obtains a bad 
outcome. Assuming risk neutrality, firms consider the expected value of output when 
determining their demand for inputs.  
Under loss consolidation, we assume that all losses can be immediately offset against profits 
elsewhere in the multinational group. The expected aggregate corporate tax base is: 





C I D K R d wL Y q qY E φ δ − − − − − + = Π 1   (B.19) 
The expected after-tax stream of dividends is: 




t t K d K d I K d c r wL Y q qY Div − + − Π − + − − − + = + + 1 1 ] [ 1 τ   (B.20) 
As before, firms maximize the value of the firm, which is the net present value of the stream of 
dividends, subject to the accumulation of capital. It yields the following first-order conditions 
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and labour: 
w Y q qY b
L
g
L = − + ) 1 (   (B.22) 
which are the familiar conditions based on the expected marginal productivity of respectively 
capital and labour. Both expressions suggest that firms set the expected marginal productivity of  
capital and labour equal to their respective prices. According to (B.21), the corporate tax raises 
the cost of capital as long as investment is not fully deductible, i.e. ø<1. 
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Under loss carry forward, firms cannot immediately offset losses. Instead, we assume they carry 
forward their loss one year and then offset it against a possible profit. The loss П
- in the 
previous year is given by: 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 < − − − − = Π − − − − − − −
−
t t f t b bt t
b
t t I D K R d wL Y φ δ   (B.23) 
The nominal value of this lagged loss (with probability 1-q) can be offset against current profits 
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where r
n is the nominal rate of return. Compared to loss carry forward, the tax base is 
unambiguously smaller under consolidation: 
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where θ≤1 is the fraction of expenditures which can be deducted from total revenues. Given the 
expected tax base in (B.24), dividends can be written as: 
( ) ( ) t bt t bt t t
L
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Note that the limited deductibility of losses implies that the first-order condition for labour is 
adjusted to: 
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which can be written as: 
























  (B.28) 
which shows that limited loss offset induces an increase in labour costs, given that w≥YL
b.  
The first-order conditions for investment It, and the stock variables Dt and Kt  now read as: 
µ λ φ θφτ + − = − ) 1 ( ) 1 (   (B.29) 
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where we abstract in (B.31) from financial distress costs and inflation. Equations (B.29)-(B.31) 
can be combined to: 
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which shows that limited loss offset raises the cost of capital if marginal productivity of capital 
in the bad outcome is less than the deductibility of debt and immediate expenses. 
Discrete location choice 
Another extension of CORTAX refers to location choice. The literature on foreign direct 
investment emphasises that investment is not only responsive to the cost of capital, but that also 
inframarginal investment and location choices are important. One reason may be that firms earn 
firm-specific economic rents that are mobile across borders. Such rents can be due to patents, 
brand names, specific managerial talents or market power. Firms then locate their affiliates in 
countries where the average effective tax rates are relatively low.  
 
In CORTAX, we do not explicitly model the origins of firm-specific economic rents. Instead, 
we endogenise the value of economic rents earned by a multinational in CORTAX in each 
location by making it dependent of the corporate tax rate. In particular, suppose that the 
multinational owns a firm-specific fixed factor H, which it can allocate between two countries, 
Hi and Hj. If the firm maximizes the sum of profits in the two locations (Πi + Πj), the first order 
condition with respect to the allocation of the fixed factor in country i reads as 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − − − =
∂
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In the production function of CORTAX, firms combine labour and capital using a CES 
production function and then combine this with the fixed factor using a cobb-douglas structure. 
This yields a simple expression for the marginal value of allocating the fixed factor in each of   63 
the two locations. Using this production structure, we can write the optimal share of the fixed 





























  (B.34) 
where X denotes the composite input of labour and capital. Hence, the share of the fixed factor 
allocated in country j relative to country i falls in the tax rate in country j relative to country i. 
In CORTAX, we model the share of the fixed factor of a multinational in a specific country as a 
function of the statutory tax rate in that country, relative to the weighted EU average. The 
responsiveness of the fixed factor to this tax differential is set so as the replicate empirical 
estimates on the impact of corporate taxes on FDI.    64 
 